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Abstract 
 
This study estimates the environmental efficiency of international listed firms in 10 
worldwide sectors from 2007-2013 by applying an order-m method, a non-parametric 
approach based on free disposal hull with subsampling bootstrapping. Using a 
conventional output of gross profit and two conventional inputs of labor and capital, this 
study examines the order-m environmental efficiency accounting for the presence of each 
of 10 undesirable inputs/outputs and measures the shadow prices of each undesirable 
input and output. The results show that there is greater potential for the reduction of 
undesirable inputs rather than bad outputs. On average, total energy, electricity, or water 
usage has the potential to be reduced by 50%. The median shadow prices of undesirable 
inputs, however, are much higher than the surveyed representative market prices. 
Approximately 10% of the firms in the sample appear to be potential sellers or production 
reducers in terms of undesirable inputs/outputs, which implies that the price of each item 
at the current level has little impact on most of the firms. Moreover, this study shows that 
the environmental, social, and governance activities of a firm do not considerably affect 
environmental efficiency. 
 
 
Key words: Data envelopment analysis; Environmental efficiency; Shadow price; Free 
disposal hull; Linear programming  
JEL classification: C14, D24, Q50 
  
2 
 
1. Introduction  
 When addressing the environmental problems facing firms or implementing 
new environmental policies, it is important to understand how firms operate their 
business in terms of the environment and efficiency. In the environmental performance 
analysis literature, both parametric and non-parametric approaches are used to estimate 
environmental efficiency in empirical studies. In particular, two of the main 
non-parametric methods are data envelopment analysis (DEA) and free disposal hull 
(FDH), which have been used in many publications (Cazals et al., 2002; Cherchye et al., 
2001; De Witte and Marques, 2010; Färe et al., 1996, 2005; Lee et al., 2002; Ishinabe et 
al., 2013).  
Both DEA and FDH are characterized by a lack of assumptions about the 
particular functional form of the production frontier and can estimate a best-practice 
frontier from observed data. However, a problem with DEA/FDH is that the 
best-practice frontier could be sensitive to super-efficient outliers (Cazals et al., 2002; 
Daraio and Simar, 2007; Tauchmann, 2011). In other words, when sample size is 
sufficiently large, a best-practice frontier estimated by DEA/FDH could be 
overestimated due to super-efficient peer decision making units (DMUs). Therefore, 
DEA/FDH efficiency scores that lack a deep examination of super-efficient DMUs, as 
in many publications, show just the upper limit of the score on the potential production 
frontier (for a review of treatment of outliers within the Journal of Environmental 
Management, see Supplementary material S1). The same is true for environmental 
efficiency analysis that uses DEA/FDH without considering super-efficient DMUs 
because the estimated score tends to be too efficient to be operational for most DMUs. 
This suggests that a sensibility analysis should be conducted on DEA/FDH. To 
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avoid the problem of outliers, Cazals et al. (2002), Daraio and Simar (2007), and 
Tauchmann (2011) propose the order-m method, which is based on FDH using 
subsampling bootstrapping to create peer DMUs and enables sensitive analysis of FDH.  
 The aim of this study is to develop a sensitivity analysis method for efficiency 
estimates, and to apply the proposed method to evaluate current situation of 
environmental efficiency among listed firms worldwide in 2007-2013. This study first 
examines the order-m method to technically evaluate environmental efficiency among 
DMUs, and develops a method of shadow price estimation to economically evaluate 
DMUs. We consider the development of order-m in the directional distance function in 
this paper is the most important contribution into the existing literature. From the 
viewpoint of empirical study, this study then evaluates the environmental efficiency of 
listed firms worldwide technically (order-m) and economically (shadow price 
estimation). In addition, this study provides insights into the characteristics of 
technically efficient firms, as a second step analysis, using a regression model.  
The primary motive of this study is to examine the environmental efficiency of 
international listed firms by adopting the order-m method of the directional distance 
function. This study considers each of ten undesirable inputs/outputs in ten respective 
models. Using an output (i.e., gross profit, which is sales minus the cost of goods sold) 
and two inputs (labor and capital), we consider each of the following items to be 
undesirable inputs/outputs. Total energy consumption, electricity use, water use, and 
paper consumption are considered to be undesirable inputs (energy and material uses); 
Scope 1, Scope 1 + 2, Scope 1 + 2 + 3, sulfur oxides (SOx), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and 
volatile organic compounds (VOC) are undesirable outputs (emissions). Note that, 
Scope 1, 2, and 3, which are greenhouse gas (GHG) emission categories, are defined in 
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GHG Protocol (see World Resources Institute and World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development, 2011, p.140) as follows: ―(Scope 1) emissions from 
operations that are owned or controlled by the reporting company; (Scope 2) emissions 
from the generation of purchased or acquired electricity, steam, heating or cooling 
consumed by the reporting company; (Scope 3) all indirect emissions (not included in 
scope 2) that occur in the value chain of the reporting company, including both 
upstream and downstream emissions.‖ 
 In examining the environmental efficiency of the order-m method, this study 
analyzes two additional topics. One is the calculation of the shadow prices, which 
indicate the maximum acceptable prices for certain firms/plants if markets exist, for 
each of the ten input/output items. Another topic is the examination of which activities 
affect the firms’ environmental efficiency using a regression model as a second step. 
Regarding the former topic, the shadow prices indicate the opportunity costs for the 
firms/plants to reduce each item by one unit. To address environmental problems, policy 
makers are often required to create markets or impose heavier taxes on environmental 
resources/emission credits. If a market is created for undesirable inputs and outputs to 
be traded or an environmental tax rate is increased, the shadow price will hint at how 
many firms/plants will be potential buyers or sellers of the item and indicate the 
potential effect of creating such markets as emission trading scheme or policy 
implementation. In other words, comparing the shadow prices to the actual market price 
could indicate a gap between a buyer (i.e., a production expander) and seller (i.e., 
production reducer).  
 This study applies two methods for calculating shadow prices, which are called 
order-m specification and parametric liner programming (LP) specification in this study. 
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Regarding order-m specification, this study derives the relative shadow prices from the 
estimated solutions to the dual problem of order-m estimation. Although this method is 
often used in DEA, it faces the challenge that dual variables (i.e., shadow prices in the 
dual DEA/FDH problem) often take a value of zero, which results in positive infinity 
shadow prices (for a similar case of FDH relative prices, see Kuosmanen et al., 2006). 
To overcome this challenge, this study simply uses values without rounding 
close-to-zero values to zero to avoid the problem by force. In a more sophisticated way, 
the appendix shows a procedure for estimating the upper and lower bounds of the 
shadow price. In addition, in a more indirect manner, this study uses parametric LP 
specification (Chambers, 2002; Fukuyama and Weber, 2008), which restores the 
convexity with a quadratic production function. The parametric LP specification 
smooths the values on the order-m production frontier over a quadratic production 
function and estimates the partial derivatives of the order-m score. 
 To examine what characteristics of firms affect calculated environmental 
performance, this study aims to find empirical evidence on the relationship between the 
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) activities of firms and efficiency levels. If 
ESG activities improve efficiency, investment in the activities can be interpreted as 
generating a return. On the other hand, if the ESG activities reduce efficiency, 
investment in these activities is interpreted as causing a loss.  
The structure of this study is as follows: Section 2 presents our model and the 
method for estimating shadow prices; Section 3 explains the dataset used in this study; 
Section 4 presents the estimated results, and section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Model  
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2.1 Preliminary construction 
Suppose that there are N DMUs, and a certain DMU, i, belongs to a set of 
DMUs, S: i ∈ S. Let x ∈ 𝑅+
𝐽
, y ∈ R+
K, and b ∈ R+
L  denote the vectors of inputs, 
desirable outputs and focal undesirable (i.e., environmentally bad) inputs/outputs, 
respectively, in the Euclidean space, R+
J+K+L. b consists of bad inputs, b
in
, and/or bad 
outputs, b
out
, and could also be expressed as b ∈ {bin,bout}. The true technology 
production set, T, in this study is defined in the Euclidean space, R+
J+K+L, as follows:  
 
       , , ,  can produce ,J K L in outT x y b R b y bx    (1) 
 
where b ∈ {bin,bout}.  
Following Deprins et al. (1984) and Cherchye et al. (2001), this study adopts 
FDH approximation to estimate the true technology set, T, by the observed DMUs. FDH 
is originally based on two minimal assumptions: the technology set, T, should envelop 
all observed data, and all inputs (x, bin) and outputs (y) are freely (or strongly) 
disposable. 
In adopting environmentally undesirable outputs, b
out
, earlier DEA studies 
often assume weak disposability of undesirable outputs (e.g., Färe et al., 1996). Under 
weak disposability, the desirable and undesirable outputs (y, b
out
) are both assumed to be 
weakly disposable as follows: if (x,y,bin ,b0
out) ∈ T, then (x,αy,bin ,αb0
out) ∈ T where 0 
< α < 1. On the other hand, weak disposability is seldom assumed in FDH 
approximation because FDH analysis is based on free (strong) disposability. Following 
Ray and Mukherjee (2007) and De Witte and Marques (2010), this study instead 
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assumes reverse disposability of undesirable outputs, which is similar to the assumption 
of free disposability. A certain level of desirable outputs, which is associated with a 
lower level of undesirable outputs, could be generated with a higher level of undesirable 
outputs. This assumption could be specifically represented as follows: if 
(x,y,bin ,b0
out) ∈ T and b1
out
≥b0
out
, then (x,y,bin ,b1
out) ∈ T. 
 Based on the two minimal assumptions and reverse disposability described 
above, we consider empirical approximation of FDH in the directional distance function 
form of primal/dual problems using LP. The empirical approximation of FDH was 
originally developed by Deprins et al. (1984). Recent studies, such as Cherchye et al. 
(2001), derive the FDH approximation directional distance function. The construction of 
the primal/dual problems of FDH approximation has been proposed in the literature (see 
Leleu, 2009). The primal problem is a maximum problem of how many times (h) a 
certain DMU can extend a set of efficiency directional vectors (g
x
, g
y
, g
b
) towards the 
production frontier. It indicates the degree to which that DMU can improve efficiency. 
On the other hand, the dual problem is a minimization problem of the difference 
between the shadow profits (i.e., dual profits) of a certain DMU and a reference peer 
DMU on the frontier (denoted by π) given a set of arbitrary shadow prices (v, u, q) that 
correspond, respectively, to x, y, and b. Given the efficiency direction vector, it indicates 
how much of a loss the certain DMU takes compared to the nearest referenced DMU on 
the frontier. It also implies that, given the efficiency direction vector, the number of 
shadow prices (v, u, q) that the DMU adopts. Following Kuosmanen et al. (2006) and 
Leleu (2009) regarding the dual DEA and FDH problems, note that the difference 
between them appears as the difference in the arbitrary shadow prices (i.e., dual 
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variables). In the dual DEA problem, shadow prices are generic (i.e., the same) for all of 
the observed DMUs. On the other hand, the shadow prices in the dual FDH problem are 
specific (i.e., different) among the different observed DMUs (n). Therefore, by using the 
generic shadow prices (i.e., making shadow prices same among DMUs) instead of the 
specific prices, the FDH problems in this study can be easily rewritten to the DEA 
problems. 
Following Leleu (2009), the directional distance function for FDH 
approximation under variable returns to scale (VRS) can be calculated by the following 
pair of primal/dual LP problems. Note that this study also adopts VRS because the 
original FDH approximation introduced by Deprins et al. (1984) corresponds to VRS 
above the primal/dual problems. The primal problem for a certain DMU, i, is 
represented as follows:  
 
  
, ,
1
, , ; , , max
i i i
FDH P
i i i i x y b n
x y b
n
x y b g g g h


   (2) 
 s.t.     ,k k kn n i n yz y y h g k K n S       (3) 
     ,j j jn n i n xz x x h g j J n S        (4) 
     ,j j ln n i n bz b b h g l L n S        (5) 
 
1
1n
n
z

  (6) 
 0 nz n S    (7) 
 
where z denotes a set of weights to determine relative efficiency. The corresponding 
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dual problem  , , ; , ,
FDH D
i i i i x y bx y b g g g

 under VRS could be expressed as follows:  
 
 
 
       
   
1 1
1
, , ,
, , ; , ,
, , ; , , , , ; , ,
, , ; , ,
min
ref ref ref ref
ref ref
j k l
s s s
FDH D
i i i i x y b
K J
k k k j j j
i i i x y b i i i i x y b ii i i i
k j
L
l l l
i i i x y b ii i
l
v u q
x y b g g g
u x y b g g g y y v x y b g g g x x
q x y b g g g b b




 

     
  

 

 
(8) 
 s.t.      
1 1 1
 
K J L
k k k j j j l l l
n n i n n i n n i
k j l
u y y v x x q b b n S
  
           (9) 
 
1 1 1
1 
K J L
k k j j l l
n y n x n b
k j l
u g v g q g n S
  
        (10) 
 0 ,
k
nu k K n S      (11) 
 0 ,
j
nv j J n S      (12) 
 0 ,
l
nq l L n S      (13) 
 
where i
ref
 denotes the referenced peer DMU (on the frontier) of DMU i. (v, u, q) denote 
a set of arbitrary shadow prices (dual variables) corresponding, respectively, to (x, y, b). 
π denotes the relative shadow profit, and the dual problem minimizes π by allowing for 
specific shadow prices (vn, un, qn) compared with other peer DMUs.  
 
2.2 Order-m of the directional distance function  
Following Cazals et al. (2002), Daraio and Simar (2007), and Tauchmann 
(2011), the order-m efficiency score is calculated by averaging the FDH scores with 
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subsampling bootstrapping D times. In each subsampling event, order-m assesses a 
certain DMU by expected best performance from a sample of m peers. Original order-m 
takes the following four steps: 1) In the d-th subsampling (d = 1,..., D), a sample of m 
peer DMUs is randomly drawn with replacement from S. Let Sd denote a set of m peer 
DMUs in the d-th subsampling. 2) The pseudo FDH efficiency 
 , , ; , ,
dFDH
mi i i i x y bx y b g g g  is calculated using this artificial reference sample. 3) Steps 
1 and 2 are repeated D times. 4) The order-m efficiency 
OM
mi is calculated as the 
average of the pseudo FDH scores: 
 
 
1
1 dDOM FDH
mi mi
dD
 

   (14) 
 
Note that if there is no solution in certain d-th iteration, this study considers the order-m 
efficiency score to be 
dFDH
mi , which is on the frontier and equals zero.  
The primal/dual problems of the order-m form are represented as the D-times 
simple average of equations (2) to (7) (i.e., the primal problem) and equations (8) to 
(13) (i.e., the dual problem) in each subsampling, Sd. The order-m primal problem as a 
directional distance function is expressed as follows:  
 
    
1
1
, , ; , , , , ; , ,
d
DOM FDH P
mi mii i i x y b i i i x y b
d
x y b g g g x y b g g g
D
 


   (15) 
 
where  , , ; , ,
dFDH P
mi i i i x y bx y b g g g

is calculated by equations (2) to (7) in the d-th 
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iteration using sub-sampling size m. The corresponding order-m dual problem as a 
directional distance function is expressed as follows: 
 
 
 
     
1
1 1 1 1
1
1
1
, , ; , ,
1
, , ; , ,
1
d
ref ref ref ref ref ref
ref ref
ref
ref
OM
mi i i i x y b
D FDH D
mi i i i x y b
d
D K J L
k k k j j j l l l
i i ii d i d i d i d i d i d
d k j l
D
k k
K i d i d
k kd
iDi
kk
i d
d
x y b g g g
x y b g g g
D
u y y v x x q b b
D
u y
u y
u




   




 
      
 
 
 
   
 
 
 

   


1
1
1
1
1
1
, , ,1
1
min
ref ref
ref
ref
ref ref
ref
ref
k j l
s s s
D
j j
J i d i d
j jd
iDi
jj
i d
d
D
l l
L i d i d
l ld
iDi
ll
i d
d
D
d
v u qd
v x
v x
v
q b
q b
q
D 








 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 


 





 
(16) 
where minimizing πd is calculated by equations (8) to (13) in the d-th sub-sampling 
iteration using sub-sampling size m. i
ref
d denotes the referenced peer DMU of a certain 
DMU, i, in the d-th iteration. Values with an overbar in equation (16) denote the average 
value of the D iterations. 
1 1
ref ref ref
D D
k k k
i d i d i d
d d
u y u
 
  , 
1 1
ref ref ref
D D
j j j
i d i d i d
d d
v x v
 
  , and 
1 1
ref ref ref
D D
l l l
i d i d i d
d d
q b q
 
   in equation (16) denote a set of (x,y,b) of a D-times 
weight-averaged reference DMU (i.e., a pseudo-reference DMU) for a certain DMU, i. 
 
2.3 Shadow price  
2.3.1 Order-m specification of shadow price 
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In the literature, the derivations of shadow prices for undesirable inputs/outputs 
are performed with nonparametric approaches, such as DEA, and the 
profit-maximization problem is often constructed with constraints to production 
technology. This problem is often solved by the Lagrange multiplier method, and this 
study follows this method for deriving shadow prices. Following Kumbhakar (1996), 
Lee et al. (2002), Färe et al. (2005), and Fukuyama and Weber (2008), the 
profit-maximization problem (i.e., maximal revenue function) with a set of production 
constraints is represented as follows: 
 
 
, ,
y i x i b i
x y b
Max p y p x p b   (17) 
 s.t.  , , ; , , 0
OM
x y b x y b
mi i i i i i ix y b g g g      (18) 
where  
 
 , , ; , ,
1  
OM
x y b j
mi i i i xxj
i j
i
x y b g g g g
j J
x



     (19) 
 
 , , ; , ,
1  
OM
x y b k
mi i i i yyk
i k
i
x y b g g g g
k K
y



     (20) 
 
 , , ; , ,
1  
OM
x y b l
mi i i i bbl
i l
i
x y b g g g g
l L
b



    . (21) 
 
(px, py, pb) denotes the respective price vectors in terms of input, output, and 
environmentally undesirable input/output prices. 
OM
mi denotes the order-m directional 
distance function, which represents the production technology for DMU i.  , ,x y bi i i  
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denotes the average inefficiency factors of input, output, and undesirable input/output, 
respectively, through D iterations. Equation (18) denotes order-m technology, 
OM
mi , on 
the frontier (i.e., 
OM
mi is equal to zero) given a set of frontier values  , ,x y bi i i i i ix y b   . 
Assuming that  , , ; , ,
OM
x y b x y b
mi i i i i i ix y b g g g     is differentiable into 
 , ,x y bi i i i i ix y b   , the Lagrangian of equations (17) and (18) could be represented as 
follows:  
 
  
, , ,
, , ; , ,
OM
x y b x y b
miy i x i b i i i i i i i
x y b
Max p y p x p b x y b g g g   

   
   .
 (22) 
 
The first-order conditions (FOCs) of the above profit-maximization problem are as 
follows: 
 
 
 , , ; , ,
0
OM
x y b x y b
mi i i i i i i
y
y iy
i i
x y b g g g
p
y
   



  

 (23) 
 
 , , ; , ,
0
OM
x y b x y b
mi i i i i i i
b
b ib
i i
x y b g g g
p
b
   



   

 (24) 
 
 , , ; , ,
0
OM
x y b x y b
mi i i i i i i
x
x ix
i i
x y b g g g
p
x
   



   

 (25) 
  , , ; , , 0
OM
x y b x y b
mi i i i i i ix y b g g g      (26) 
 
From equations (22) and (26), we can calculate the relative shadow price of a 
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focal l-th undesirable input/output toward the price of a k-th good output as follows:  
 
 
 
 
, , ; , ,
, , ; , ,
OM
x y b x y b bl l
l blmi i i i i i i i i
b i
OMk ykx y b x y b yk k
y mi ii i i i i i i i
x y b g g g bp
p x y b g g g y
     
    
 
  
 
. (27) 
 
The relative price (left hand side of equation (27)) of b (bad input/output) over y (good 
output) is represented as the ratio of the partial differentiations of b and y multiplied by 
the ratio of the inefficiencies of b and y ( bl yki i  ). If DMU i is on the frontier, 
bl yk
i i   equals one. If DMU i is not on the frontier and is less efficient or 
super-efficient, bl yki i   will vary depending on the directional vectors (gx, gy, gb). 
For example, if gy and gb are more than zero, 
bl yk
i i   of a less efficient DMU is less 
than one and is zero at minimum. In a similar way, bl yki i  of a super-efficient DMU 
should be more than one. We can directly estimate the relative shadow price between 
output (y) and an undesirable input/output (b) as follows (we call this method order-m 
specification). Each model in this study considers four dimensions of (x, y, b): labor (j = 
1) and capital (j = 2) as input x, gross profit (k = 1) as output y, and each undesirable 
input/output (l = 1). Following the shadow prices in the dual order-m problem and 
equation (27), the relative price of a bad input/output (b1) over gross profit (y1) can be 
rewritten as follows:  
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. (28) 
 
Because the price of gross profit (y1) should be one (i.e., $1), 
1 1
b yp p will be equal to 
p
b
l . Note that the negative sign in equation (28) is cancelled out, which is unlike Lee et 
al. (2002) and Fukuyama and Weber (2008) because their signs for the bad input/output 
dual variables are opposite to those used in this study.  
In calculating equation (28), the constraints are that the two denominators,
1y
i and  1 , , ; , ,ref x y b x y bi i i i i iiu x y b g g g   , should not be equal to zero. The former 
constraint,  1 0yi  , should be easily satisfied when a set of observed data (x, y, b) 
and directional vectors (g
x
, g
y
, g
b
) are all positive and all non-negative, respectively, for 
all DMUs as well as the setting. An immediate problem is avoiding 
 1 , , ; , ,ref x y b x y bi i i i i iiu x y b g g g    being zero, but there should be multiple solutions. 
Simply, this study uses an interior point solution that gives the solutions without 
rounding close-to-zero values to zero and avoids the problem by force. In a more 
sophisticated way, Fukuyama and Weber (2008) provide a procedure for estimating the 
upper and lower bounds of the shadow price (the Appendix shows an application of 
their procedure to the order-m method).  
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2.3.2 Parametric LP specification 
In an indirect manner, this study smooths values on the order-m production 
frontier over a quadratic production function following Chambers (2002) and Fukuyama 
and Weber (2008) (we call this parametric LP specification). This specification requires 
three steps. First, to estimate value sets of inputs, an output, and bad inputs/outputs on 
the frontier (i.e., to remove the super-efficient value sets), we estimate inefficiency 
scores using the order-m method (i.e., ( , ,x y bi i i   ) in equation (19), (20), and (21)). 
Note that because the direction should be same among the DMUs in this specification, 
we set (g
x
, g
y
, g
b
) = (0, 1000, 1).  
 Using the frontier value sets ( , ,x y bi i i i i ix y b   ) for all DMUs, we then estimate 
the directional output distance function on the frontier assuming convexity. Suppose that 
ϕ denotes a sum of two effects: inefficiency due to convexity and estimation error, and ϕ 
≥ 0. Then, the efficiency of LP specification,  , , ; , ,LP x y b x y bi i i i i i ix y b g g g    , is 
represented as follows:  
 
 
   , , ; , , , , ; , ,
OM
LP x y b x y b x y b x y b
mii i i i i i i i i i i i i i
i
x y b g g g x y b g g g        

 

. (29) 
 
In particular, this study adopts LPi in a quadratic functional form following Chambers 
(2002) and Fukuyama and Weber (2008) as follows: 
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. (30) 
 
Here, following Chambers (2002) and Fukuyama and Weber (2008), conditions of 
symmetry on the second order terms and the translation property of the directional 
distance function are imposed in equation (30) as follows:  
 , ; , ; ,jj j j kk k k ll l lj j k k l l                   (31) 
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 (32) 
 
Then, following Färe et al. (2005) and Fukuyama and Weber (2008), two additional 
restrictions are imposed:  
 
  , , ; , , 0LP x y b x y bi i i i i i ix y b g g g i       (33) 
  , , ; , , 0 ,LP x y b x y b yi i i i i i i ki kix y b g g g y k i         . (34) 
 
To estimate the parameters of equation (30), we adopt the deterministic LP procedure of 
Aigner and Chu (1968) and Fukuyama and Weber (2008). This procedure minimizes the 
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sum of the DMU deviations between the LP specification efficiency, 
 , , ; , ,LP x y b x y bi i i i i i ix y b g g g    , and the frontier value (i.e., zero) as follows:  
 
 
  min , , ; , , 0
min
LP x y b x y b
i i i i i i i
i
i
i
x y b g g g   





. (35) 
 
 To estimate shadow price, we use the estimated efficiency, 
LP
i , adopting the 
Lagrangian as in equation (22) as follows:  
 
  
, , ,
, , ; , ,
LP
x y b x y b
iy i x i b i i i i i i i
x y b
Max p y p x p b x y b g g g   

   
  
. (36) 
 
As in the order-m specification, from equation (36), the relative price of certain b over 
certain y can be estimated (see Supplementary material S2). Note again that each model 
in this study considers the following four dimensions of (x, y, b): labor (j = 1) and 
capital (j = 2) as input x, gross profit (k = 1) as output y, and each undesirable 
input/output (l = 1). Then, using equation (36), the relative price of a bad input/output (l 
= 1) over a good output (k = 1) can be rewritten as follows: 
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Here, because the price of gross profit (p
y
1) should be one (i.e., $1), p
b
1 p
y
1⁄  will be equal 
to p
b
1.  
 
2.4 Regression model 
The previous subsections detail the efficiency analysis model used in this study 
as a first step. This subsection describes the regression model used as a second step. The 
aim of this regression is to examine the correlation between present (i.e., 2007-2013) 
ESG activities and the inefficiency of using and/or outputting undesirable materials. In 
the regression model, the independent variable is each order-m score, and the dependent 
variable is the degree to which ESG activities are practiced. The regression model as a 
second step is expressed as follows:  
 
   0 1, , ; , ,
OM
x y b
mi i i ix y b g g g ESG e       (38) 
 
where e denotes an error term, and ESG denotes the degree of ESG activities.  
 The coefficient of ESG, β1, in equation (38) would explain how the efficiency 
is affected by ESG activities. When β1 of certain ESG activities is significantly different 
from zero and positive, it implies that more activities are performed by less efficient 
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firms to use and/or output environmentally undesirable items. Here, the practice of ESG 
activities is also interpreted as an investment. Therefore, a positive β1 implies that the 
investment of certain ESG activities causes a loss in efficiency. On the other hand, when 
β1 of certain ESG activities is significantly negative, the interpretation should be the 
opposite. A negative β1 implies that activities are practiced to a greater degree by more 
efficient firms for the use and/or output of environmentally undesirable items or that the 
investment of certain ESG activities generates a return in the form of improved 
efficiency. 
 
2.5 Settings 
 To estimate the order-m approximation, study adopts the directional vectors, 
(g
x
, g
y
, g
b
) = (0, y, b), and VRS. These vectors seek the simultaneous maximum 
reduction in undesirable inputs/outputs and expansion in good outputs (Färe et al., 
2005). It also considers that it is often more difficult to adjust production capability such 
as capital and labor in the short run than outputs and intermediate inputs. For D and m, 
which are the number of iterations and the size of the subsampling peer DMUs, 
respectively, this study sets 1,000 as D and 100% of the original peer DMUs as m. In 
addition, to set the peer DMUs, we first divide the industries into 10 sectors based on 
the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) for sector identification (see 
Supplementary material Table S.1). The peer DMUs for each DMU, i, are collected 
within a certain sector to which i belongs. Therefore, DMU i may refer to other past or 
future DMUs within the dataset.  
 In the parametric LP specification for estimating shadow price, this study 
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adopts (g
x
, g
y
, g
b
) = (0, 1000, 1). We follow Färe et al. (2005) and Fukuyama and 
Weber (2008), which set gy = 1 and gb =1; however, because digit number of y in this 
study is considerably larger than b, we adjust digits by setting gy = 1000. As with the 
order-m specification, D is set as 1,000, and 100% of the original peer DMUs is set for 
m. As with the order-m specification as well, we consider firms within the same sector 
(see Table S.1) to be peer DMUs.  
 For the regression analysis in equation (38), it is supposed that the relationship 
between ESG activities and inefficiency could be clustered by industrial classification. 
Therefore, this study uses the GICS subindustry classifications (see Table S.1) as 
clusters and estimates cluster-robust standard errors to assess the significance level of 
the coefficient.  
 
3. Data 
 The information used in this study comes from Bloomberg Professional service 
and consists of data from between 2007 and 2013 for listed firms in 10 sectors around 
the world (unbalanced panel data). The Bloomberg Professional service (also known as 
Bloomberg Terminal), which is provided by Bloomberg Limited Partnership (where its 
headquarters is in New York City, New York, U.S.), provides market information such 
as real-time financial market data, market news, and price quotes, and enables to place 
trades on the electronic trading platform, through online access to the proprietary 
computer system. We obtain firm-level data via market screening of the Bloomberg 
Professional service. The number of total and net observations (obs) are 7,396 and 1,735, 
respectively (see Supplementary material Table S.2), and the 10 sectors are as follows: 
energy (#10; 339 obs), materials (#15; 1334 obs), industrial (#20; 1764 obs), consumer 
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discretionary (#25; 1141 obs), consumer staples (#30; 881 obs), health care (#35; 466 
obs), financial (#40; 199 obs), information technology (#45; 918 obs), 
telecommunication services (#50; 142 obs), and utilities (#55; 185 obs) (see 
Supplementary material Table S.3 for the number of observations in each sector for each 
model). Table 1 and Supplementary material Table S.4, respectively show the 
descriptive statistics for all sectors combined and for each sector individually, and 
Supplementary material Table S.5 shows the representative correlations. For output, y, 
we use gross profit (i.e., sales minus the cost of goods sold) at the nominal price (U.S. 
dollars). In terms of inputs, x, we use the number of employees (persons) and capital 
stock as surrogate variables of labor and capital, respectively. The capital stock is 
calculated with the benchmark-year method (base year: 2005) as follows:
       1K t K t I t R t     where K, I, and R denote capital stock, new investment, 
and retirement cost, respectively. We use net fixed assets as new investments and 
retirement cost as depreciable fixed assets. t represents time (years). The base year is 
assumed to be 2005, and the 2005 capital stock is the net fixed assets. If a capital stock 
value for a certain firm is missing in 2005, the first available value after 2005 is used as 
the base year for that firm.  
 For undesirable inputs (b
in
), we use four items: energy consumption (MWh), 
electricity use (MWh), water use (cubic meter), and paper consumption (metric ton). 
For undesirable outputs (b
out
), we use six items: Scope 1, Scope 1+2, Scope 1+2+3, SOx, 
NOx, and VOC (metric ton). Note that in each estimation of the efficiency, we use each 
of the undesirable inputs/outputs, b, above along with inputs, x, and an output, y, to 
ensure enough observations for each estimation. This is because, unlike financial data, 
there are many missing values for the undesirable inputs/outputs, b. 
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To assess the estimated shadow prices based on actual prices, Table 2 shows a 
list of representative market prices for emissions/resource use in recent years. Note that 
this survey is limited because the prices are only from certain parts of the world, and 
there is no representative market price for total energy consumption and VOC. However, 
the table provides an indication of whether the estimated shadow prices are relatively 
expensive. The average retail electricity prices from 28 OECD countries reported by the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) (2013), which include price data for both industries 
and households, were nominally $128.3 (U.S. dollars) and $213.2 for industries and 
households, respectively. For water use, the average water tariff charged to households 
in 29 OECD countries was $2.05 in 2008. Regarding paper use, the price of wood pulp 
in the global commodity market was $823.1 per metric ton in 2013. Regarding GHGs, 
the price per ton of phase 2 in the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) 
ranged from below 10 Euros to 30 Euros from 2008-2012. For SOx, SOx allowance 
prices in the U.S. ranged between $0.56 to more than $1,200 per ton from 1994-2012 
(Schmalensee and Stavins, 2013). Finally, regarding NOx, the NOx allowance prices in 
the U.S. ranged between $80 and a few thousand U.S. dollars per ton from 2001-2012. 
 In the second step regression model, we use eight dummy variables related to 
ESG activities from Bloomberg dataset for the ESG activities (see Supplementary 
material Table S.6 for description). Energy efficiency policy (EEPol) indicates whether 
the company has implemented any initiatives to make its use of energy more efficient. 
Environmental quality management (EQM) indicates whether the company has 
introduced any type of environmental quality management and/or environmental 
management system to help reduce the environmental footprint of its operations. Green 
building policy (GBPol) indicates whether the company has taken any steps towards 
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using environmental technologies and/or environmental principles in the design and 
construction of its buildings. Sustainable packaging (SPack) indicates whether the 
company has taken any steps to make its packaging more environmentally friendly, 
which might include efforts to improve the recyclability of its packaging and the use of 
less environmentally damaging materials in its packaging, among others. Environmental 
supply chain policy (ESCPol) indicates whether the company has implemented any 
initiatives to reduce the environmental footprint of its supply chain. Waste reduction 
policy (WastePol) indicates whether the company has implemented any initiatives to 
reduce the waste generated during the course of its operations. GHG reduction initiative 
(GHGIni) indicates whether the company has implemented any initiatives to reduce its 
air emissions. GHG reduction policy (GHGPol) indicates whether the company has 
outlined its intention to help reduce global GHG emissions, which cause climate change, 
through its ongoing operations and/or the use of its products and services. Note that 
because there are missing values for the ESG dummy variables, the estimate from each 
regression might be smaller than the order-m estimation.  
   
4. Results and discussions 
4.1 Order-m and FDH scores 
Table 3 shows the results of the efficiency analysis, order-m (upper part) and 
FDH (lower part). Each row denotes efficiency scores in each percentile (10th-90th), 
average values and standard deviations. Each column denotes the result using each type 
of undesirable inputs/outputs along with gross profit (y), labor, and capital (x). The 
efficiency score denotes the percentage to which a certain firm can increase gross profit 
(y) and decrease each undesirable input/output (b).  
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For the undesirable inputs (columns 1, 2, 3, and 4), the respective median 
order-m and FDH values are 0.475 and 0.543 for energy consumption, 0.488 and 0.565 
for electricity use, 0.525 and 0.604 for water use, and −0.014 and 0.000 for paper 
consumption. Regarding the undesirable outputs (columns 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10), the 
median order-m and FDH values are 0.167 and 0.227 for Scope 1, 0.184 and 0.258 for 
Scope 1+2, 0.000 and 0.017 for Scope 1+2+3, −0.072 and 0.125 for SOx, 0.215 and 
0.273 for NOx, and 0.000 and 0.006 for VOC.  
In setting D (1000) and m (100% of the original sample size), the difference 
between the order-m and FDH scores is not large, but it is measurable. The difference is 
about five percent on average, and the minimum and maximum values of the differences 
are 0.006 for VOC efficiency and 0.079 for water use efficiency, respectively.  
This result shows that there is more potential for a reduction in undesirable 
inputs (except for paper use) than for undesirable output reduction. In particular, it 
implies that total energy consumption, electricity use, or water use have the potential for 
an approximately 50% reduction on average. Regarding undesirable output reduction, 
while the efficiencies of Scope 1 and Scope 1+2 indicate a median potential for 
improvement of less than 20%, the efficiency of Scope 1+2+3 implies no reduction 
potential at present (0.0%). For other emissions, while the efficiency of SOx and NOx 
show a certain degree of improvement potential (7.2% and 21.5%, respectively), VOC 
emission shows no reduction potential (0.0%).
1
 
 Table 4 shows the median order-m scores in each sector. Considering 
undesirable inputs as a whole, industrials (#20), consumer discretionary (#25), and 
                                                   
1
 We need to note that by reducing the consumption of energy that contains more emissions and/or 
by using other types of energy of less polluting emission, environmental efficiency would improve in 
both dimensions of undesirable inputs and undesirable outputs; however, this topic is not the focus 
of this paper and presents an interesting and more practically question for future research. 
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telecommunication services (#50) are inclined to be less efficient than the other sectors 
whereas energy (#10), materials (#15), and consumer staples (#30) show average 
inefficiency (i.e., near the median). On the other hand, for the order-m scores of 
undesirable outputs as a whole, the result shows the different propensities of the GHGs 
(Scope 1, 1+2, 1+2+3) and the other emissions (SOx, NOx, and VOC). While the 
inefficiency scores of the GHGs (Scope 1, 1+2, 1+2+3) tend to be higher than the 
median (i.e., less efficient) in industrials (#20), consumer discretionary (#25), consumer 
staples (#30), and information technology (#45), the inefficiency scores of the other 
emissions (SOx, NOx, and VOC) tend to be higher (i.e., less efficient) in energy (#10), 
materials (#15), and telecommunication services (#50). 
 
4.2 Shadow prices 
Table 5 shows the percentiles of the shadow prices estimated by order-m 
specification (order-m) and parametric LP specification (LP). Each column denotes the 
results for each type of undesirable inputs/outputs (b) along with gross output (y), labor, 
and capital (x). Each row represents representative percentiles of the estimated shadow 
prices (from 10th to 90th). Supplementary material Table S.7 shows the coefficients 
from the parametric LP specifications. 
Comparing order-m with LP, the result shows that the number of digits (of 
shadow prices) is similar in both specifications, but the difference in estimated values is 
measurable. Regarding undesirable input (columns 1, 2, 3, and 4), the median order-m 
and LP values of the shadow prices are $1,260,000 and $1,699,798 for total energy 
consumption (MWh), $4,974 and $8,242 for electricity use (MWh), $447,435 and 
$361,900 for water use (cubic meter), and $1,440,000,000 and $70,300,000 for paper 
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consumption (ton). On the other hand, considering undesirable outputs (columns 5, 6, 7, 
8, 9, and 10), the median order-m and FDH values of the shadow prices are $9,065 and 
$11,326 for Scope 1 (ton), $3,725 and $5,713 for Scope 1+2 (ton), $4,462  and $6,202 
for Scope 1+2+3 (ton), $3,598,447 and $808,779 for SOx (ton), $2,072,486 and 
$647,261 for NOx (ton), and $2,180,000,000 and $588,000,000 for VOC (ton).  
Table 6 shows the median shadow prices (order-m and LP) in each sector. As a 
whole, the shadow prices for the undesirable inputs tend to be higher in consumer 
discretionary (#25), health care (#35), information technology (#45), and 
telecommunication services (#50) than the median (columns 1, 2, 3, and 4). In addition 
to undesirable inputs, the shadow prices of undesirable outputs tend to be above the 
median in health care (#35) and information technology (#45) (columns 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 
and 10). 
 The result shows that the median shadow prices of undesirable inputs/outputs 
are much higher than the surveyed representative market prices (Table 2)
2
. If the 
surveyed representative market prices are mandated worldwide, the result indicates that 
less than 10% of the sample firms should be potential sellers or production reducers of 
all undesirable inputs/outputs, except for total energy consumption and VOC.  
Note that the distribution of the shadow prices for Scope 1, Scope 1+2, and 
Scope 1+2+3 are similar to the estimate for GHGs in Ishinabe et al. (2013). Using a 
dataset of 1,024 international companies worldwide, their result shows that the shadow 
prices for GHGs are less than $100 per ton in 10% of the sampled firms, between $100 
and $1,000 in 18% of the firms, and between $1,001 and $10,000 in 42% of the firms. 
 
                                                   
2
 However, there is no representative market price for total energy consumption and VOC. 
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4.3 Regression result 
Table 7 shows the result of the second step regression model. Overall, there are 
only a few variables that are statistically different from zero. The overall implication is 
that ESG activities do not considerably affect environmental efficiency. We detected the 
following statistically significant variables. Green building policy (GBPol) is 
statistically different from zero and positively correlated with the order-m (inefficiency) 
scores of Scope 1 (column 5) and significantly negatively correlated with the 
inefficiency of VOC (column 10). This indicates that an investment in a green building 
policy is correlated with a low return and/or a large amount of GHG emissions but also 
with a high return and/or reduced amount of VOC emissions. GHG reduction policy 
(GHGPol) has significant negative relationship with the inefficiency of Scope 1 
(column 5), which indicates that a GHG reduction policy investment currently achieves 
a profit and/or Scope 1 (GHG) reduction. 
 
4.4. Conclusions and implications 
This study measures the environmental efficiency of international listed firms 
worldwide (from 2007-2013) using the order-m method, which is a non-parametric 
approach based on FDH with subsampling bootstrapping. Along with a conventional 
output (gross output) and two conventional inputs (labor and capital), we consider 10 
undesirable inputs/outputs in each sector and sub-industry studied as follows: total 
energy consumption, electricity use, water use, and paper consumption as undesirable 
inputs; Scope 1, Scope 1 + 2, Scope 1 + 2 + 3, SOx, NOx, and VOC as undesirable 
outputs. In addition, to examine the environmental efficiency of order-m, this study 
analyzes two additional topics: the estimation of shadow prices and a regression model 
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as a second analytical step that incorporates ESG activities as explanatory variables.  
This study has important policy implications. The results suggest that even if a 
market exists to trade environmentally undesirable inputs/outputs between firms or if 
the environmental taxes are higher than the current level, many firms would still be 
willing to purchase allowances to expand their production. Therefore, the current price 
does not considerably influence firms. However, because there are many potential 
buyers, the result also implies that the market price of the allowances or credits could 
jump depending on the circumstances and result in a buoyant market.  
Another implication is that there is much reduction potential for these 
efficiencies, especially of the undesirable inputs rather than the undesirable outputs. 
This means that when a production technology is adopted by a leader within a certain 
industry, the industry will experience a higher reduction rate in undesirable inputs than 
undesirable outputs. For example, the amount of energy consumption is highly 
correlated with the amount of GHG emissions (Scope 1, 2, 3) (Supplementary material 
Table S.5 shows a correlation table of this study), so from the standpoint of an 
environmental efficiency, reduced energy consumption should be considered over a 
reduction in GHG emissions. However, the result of this study does not mean that it is 
less expensive to reduce undesirable inputs, especially the use of energy and water, than 
to reduce undesirable outputs. This study shows there is great reduction potential for 
these efficiencies but does not address cost effectiveness.  
In addition, it would be worth to have a deeper analysis of the ESG activities of 
global firms because the result shows that the impact of ESG activities on 
environmental efficiency is quite limited. This could imply that the representative ESG 
activities undertaken by listed firms worldwide are not presently directly connected with 
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the main business and environmental efficiency. To improve environmental efficiency, it 
seems necessary to shift the production technology of the main business towards 
environmental friendliness rather than implement a set of ad-hoc ESG activities. 
Therefore, the empirical result might suggest that improving environmental efficiency 
could be more expensive than expected.  
Note that data limitation remains a key issue. As described above, unlike 
financial data, access to environmental data is still limited. The environmental data used 
in this study lacks many variables, and due to this limitation, this study could only 
consider 10 undesirable inputs/outputs in each model and could not align the 
observations of each model. An examination of regional and country environmental 
efficiency characteristics is also required. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Gross profit 7,369 3,550,000,000 7,930,000,000 795,165 84,000,000,000 
Labor 7,369 29,827 58,575 2 648,254 
Capital stock 7,369 5,970,000,000 16,800,000,000 241,694 276,000,000,000 
Energy cons. 6,059  9,252  60,985  0.1  3,936,340  
Electricity use 5,006  1,175,007  7,182,663  0.7  251,000,000  
Water use 5,377  76,548  640,602  0.2  36,500,000  
Paper cons. 866  116  1,168  0.1  24,000  
Scope 1 2,267  3,514,233  13,200,000  1.8  203,000,000  
Scope 1+2 2,181  4,250,000,000  14,100,000,000  147,000.0  227,000,000,000  
Scope 1+2+3 1,049  13,800,000,000  76,100,000,000  536,500.0  775,000,000,000  
SOx 1,702  23,087  204,681  0.1  3,189,997  
NOx 2,459  40,684  499,631  0.1  11,200,000  
VOC 890  19  287  0.1  8,500  
EEPol 7,349 0.92 0.28 0 1 
EQM 7,358 0.79 0.41 0 1 
GBPol 7,354 0.16 0.37 0 1 
SPack 7,355 0.25 0.44 0 1 
EnvSCPol 7,352 0.63 0.48 0 1 
WastePol 7,357 0.84 0.37 0 1 
GHGini 7,355 0.89 0.31 0 1 
GHGPol 7,357 0.69 0.46 0 1 
 
Notes:  
Gross profit denotes sales minus cost of goods sold (U.S. dollars at nominal price). Labor denotes 
the number of employees (persons). Capital stock is estimated by benchmark year method where 
bench mark year is 2005. Unit of energy consumption and electricity use is megawatt hour (MWh). 
Unit of water use is cubic meter. Units of paper consumption, scope 1/1+2/1+2+3, SOx, NOx, and 
VOC are metric ton. EEPol, EQM, GBPol, SPack, ESCPol, WRPol, GHGini, and GHGPol denote 
dummy variables of ESG activities (see Supplementary material Table S.6). Supplementary material 
Table S.4 shows descriptive statistics by sector.  
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Table 2. Survey for representative market prices 
Category Unit Representative market price Source 
Energy consumption MWh ― ― 
Electricity use MWh Average electricity retail prices are $128.3 
(U.S. dollars) for industries and $213.2 for 
households in 28 OECD countries
 a)
 
IEA (2013) 
Water use cubic 
meter 
Average water tariff charged to households 
in 29 OECD countries
 b) c)
 is $2.05 in 2008  
OECD (2010) 
Paper use ton Price of wood pulp is $823.1 per metric ton 
in 2013 
World Bank 
DataBank
 d)
 
Scope 1, 2, 3 of GHG ton The price per ton of phase 2 in EU ETS 
ranged about below 10 Euros to 30 Euros 
in 2008-2012 
European 
Commission 
(2012) 
SOx ton SO2 allowance prices in the U.S. ranged 
between $0.56 and more than $1,200 per 
ton in 1994-2012 
Schmalensee and 
Stavins (2013) 
NOx ton NOx allowance prices in the U.S. ranged 
between $80 and a few thousand U.S. 
dollars per ton in 2001-2012 
Burtraw and  
Szambelan (2009); 
Environmental 
Protection Agency 
Progress Report
 e)
 
VOC ton ― ― 
 
Notes:  
(a) The 28 OECD countries are Belgium, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States. 
(b) Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
United Kingdom, United States 
(c) This survey is carried out by Global Water Intelligence (http://www.globalwaterintel.com).  
(d) World Bank DataBank: Global Economic Monitor Commodities of the World Bank 
(http://databank.worldbank.org/) 
(e) http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progress/progress-reports.html 
 
 
 
37 
 
 
Table 3. Percentiles of order-m and FDH scores in all sectors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Percentile Energy Cons. Electricity use Water use Paper cons. Scope 1 Scope 1+2 Scope 1+2+3 SOx NOx VOC 
 order-m score 
10th −0.077 −0.087 −0.082 −0.210 −0.160 −0.149 −0.209 −0.165 −0.138 −0.176 
20th −0.020 −0.027 −0.019 −0.123 −0.079 −0.071 −0.118 −0.094 −0.067 −0.098 
30th 0.092 0.080 0.111 −0.078 −0.038 −0.029 −0.072 −0.053 −0.028 −0.055 
40th 0.285 0.288 0.321 −0.052 0.001 0.020 −0.039 −0.011 0.040 −0.028 
50th 0.475 0.488 0.525 −0.014 0.167 0.184 0.000 0.072 0.215 0.000 
60th 0.647 0.652 0.706 0.000 0.386 0.364 0.086 0.241 0.421 0.129 
70th 0.794 0.801 0.848 0.110 0.603 0.588 0.287 0.436 0.627 0.323 
80th 0.891 0.898 0.936 0.394 0.792 0.757 0.530 0.663 0.835 0.554 
90th 0.962 0.960 0.983 0.734 0.924 0.901 0.791 0.922 0.955 0.789 
Mean 0.004 −1.335 −0.293 −0.559 0.179 0.260 0.091 −0.832 0.015 0.043 
Std. Dev. 21.250 66.428 18.427 7.820 2.222 0.657 0.970 33.083 8.695 1.721 
 FDH score 
10th 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
20th 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
30th 0.133 0.125 0.160 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
40th 0.344 0.345 0.394 0.000 0.039 0.065 0.000 0.000 0.076 0.000 
50th 0.543 0.565 0.604 0.000 0.227 0.258 0.017 0.125 0.273 0.006 
60th 0.713 0.740 0.786 0.000 0.489 0.458 0.135 0.308 0.512 0.185 
70th 0.839 0.859 0.907 0.165 0.697 0.671 0.375 0.528 0.720 0.400 
80th 0.920 0.936 0.965 0.473 0.863 0.819 0.622 0.775 0.906 0.659 
90th 0.974 0.983 0.991 0.800 0.968 0.934 0.829 0.979 0.984 0.838 
Mean 0.497 0.506 0.531 0.192 0.379 0.370 0.248 0.323 0.396 0.256 
Std. Dev. 0.383 0.391 0.397 0.319 0.391 0.375 0.334 0.376 0.396 0.337 
Obs 6,059 5,006 5,377 866 2,267 2,181 1,049 1,702 2,459 890 
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Table 4. The median of order-m scores by sector 
  Undesirable input bin Undesirable output bout 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Percentile Sector Energy Cons. Electricity use Water use Paper cons. Scope 1 Scope 1+2 Scope 1+2+3 SOx NOx VOC 
50th 10 0.410 −0.067 0.187 −0.096 0.111 0.051 −0.076 0.527 0.460 0.257 
50th 15 0.465 0.404 0.534 −0.035 0.149 0.134 −0.015 0.110 0.490 0.247 
50th 20 0.586 0.661 0.624 0.026 0.402 0.459 0.229 0.031 0.138 −0.017 
50th 25 0.697 0.747 0.771 −0.008 0.456 0.431 0.018 0.052 0.048 −0.010 
50th 30 0.274 0.302 0.277 −0.098 0.117 0.222 0.029 0.005 −0.018 −0.026 
50th 35 0.026 0.026 0.039 −0.068 −0.018 −0.011 −0.034 −0.027 0.008 −0.019 
50th 40 −0.015 −0.050 0.038 −0.011 0.172 0.121 −0.032 0.000 −0.071 −3.279 
50th 45 0.699 0.663 0.928 −0.001 0.260 0.275 0.012 0.140 0.331 −0.002 
50th 50 0.000 −0.008 −0.034 −0.072 −0.046 −0.037 −0.058 n/a 0.000 n/a 
50th 55 0.000 −0.085 −0.034 −0.114 −0.088 −0.103 −0.113 −0.140 −0.002 −0.128 
50th All 0.475 0.488 0.525 −0.014 0.167 0.184 0.000 0.072 0.215 0.000 
Obs  6,059 5,006 5,377 866 2,267 2,181 1,049 1,702 2,459 890 
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Table 5. Percentiles of shadow prices in all sectors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Percentile 
Energy Cons. 
(MWh) 
Electricity use 
(MWh) 
Water use 
(cubic meter) 
Paper cons. 
(ton) 
Scope 1 
(ton) 
Scope 
1+2 
Scope 
1+2+3 
SOx 
(ton) 
NOx 
(ton) 
VOC 
(ton) 
 Estimated by order-m specification 
10th 1,530 27 184 914,583 18 16 29 24 843 5,022,230 
20th 24,110 247 5,007 27,800,000 222 151 208 16,396 24,974 125,000,000 
30th 124,064 899 30,881 119,000,000 872 555 770 161,742 127,532 344,000,000 
40th 426,492 2,221 128,492 426,000,000 3,153 1,558 2,269 715,389 542,506 838,000,000 
50th 1,260,000 4,974 447,435 1,440,000,000 9,065 3,725 4,462 3,598,447 2,072,486 2,180,000,000 
60th 3,139,771 10,999 1,288,696 2,600,000,000 24,370 8,239 7,809 17,800,000 7,102,320 4,460,000,000 
70th 9,027,860 23,673 3,758,059 5,830,000,000 71,186 19,384 13,885 67,400,000 20,000,000 8,570,000,000 
80th 31,500,000 73,487 20,900,000 14,700,000,000 226,519 53,449 33,059 288,000,000 76,500,000 29,400,000,000 
90th 83,800,000,000 164,000,000 12,400,000,000 56,100,000,000 1,836,562 388,050 132,354 2,120,000,000 535,000,000 105,000,000,000 
 Estimated by parametric LP specification 
10th 37,824 558 6,634 10,062 184 220 73 608 2,834 8,782 
20th 136,180 1,340 27,530 54,404 671 583 282 6,118 11,913 34,267 
30th 357,861 2,537 77,945 302,478 2,182 1,601 1,865 40,016 40,575 560,660 
40th 746,672 4,385 168,954 7,915,198 5,449 2,804 3,939 195,853 156,551 38,600,000 
50th 1,699,798 8,242 361,900 70,300,000 11,326 5,713 6,202 808,779 647,261 588,000,000 
60th 3,724,932 15,682 830,752 393,000,000 24,645 9,733 10,857 4,462,802 2,820,864 3,530,000,000 
70th 11,100,000 30,115 2,441,879 2,010,000,000 64,437 19,475 22,003 54,000,000 19,200,000 12,100,000,000 
80th 59,900,000 67,486 11,700,000 7,080,000,000 252,795 44,461 42,434 605,000,000 124,000,000 45,200,000,000 
90th 1,210,000,000 220,745 133,000,000 34,100,000,000 2,301,315 129,873 121,969 6,170,000,000 1,770,000,000 181,000,000,000 
Obs 6,059 5,006 5,377 866 2,267 2,181 1,049 1,702 2,459 890 
Note: Units of each percentile are U.S. dollars at nominal price. 
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Table 6. The median of shadow price by sector 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Percentile Sector 
Energy Cons. 
(MWh) 
Electricity use 
(MWh) 
Water use 
(cubic meter) 
Paper cons. 
(ton) 
Scope 1 
(ton) 
Scope  
1+2 
Scope 
1+2+3 
SOx 
(ton) 
NOx 
(ton) 
VOC 
(ton) 
  Estimated by order-m specification 
50th 10 285,135 4,265 102,533 2,400,000,000 901 788 192 175,539 151,062 404,000,000 
50th 15 108,669 932 15,342 1,029,488 666 445 487 313,766 443,714 774,000,000 
50th 20 1,003,049 3,576 575,736 2,890,000,000 8,169 4,460 2,962 12,000,000 2,751,331 2,150,000,000 
50th 25 7,506,619 15,474 1,937,559 702,000,000 48,242 9,857 7,277 41,700,000 8,427,089 1,360,000,000 
50th 30 998,832 2,566 214,828 67,400,000 6,953 2,738 2,089 34,600,000 12,800,000 63,800,000,000 
50th 35 4,825,840 12,175 908,853 3,050,000,000 48,558 11,994 12,530 82,200,000 23,200,000 14,600,000,000 
50th 40 1,507,601 2,363 551,467 1,860,000,000 77,677 9,979 12,458 101,176 77,988 −36,200,000,000 
50th 45 13,200,000 22,049 7,394,800 2,460,000,000 147,657 19,710 10,881 37,500,000 48,600,000 56,700,000,000 
50th 50 4,737,212 6,243 7,848,501 595,000,000 146,145 11,204 11,029 n/a 3,263,526 n/a 
50th 55 70,800 1,733 3,619 5,310,000,000 477 498 220 161,742 129,776 6,920,000,000 
50th All 1,260,000 4,974 447,435 1,440,000,000 9,065 3,725 4,462 3,598,447 2,072,486 2,180,000,000 
  Estimated by parametric LP specification 
50th 10 41,106 3,614 244,108 651,990 4,059 1,276 57 53,183 50,501 11,200,000 
50th 15 867,917 988 22,634 14,800,000 245 295 72 123,652 204,399 28,500,000 
50th 20 603,032 19,151 718,289 6,511,686 6,119 6,207 4,662 323,179 272,394 4,280,000,000 
50th 25 1,878,529 14,471 441,775 29,000,000 67,870 19,316 11,009 11,600,000 3,313,659 728,000,000 
50th 30 32,300,000 37,482 913,563 76,500,000 17,154 6,204 14,695 121,000,000 3,158,504 1,450,000,000 
50th 35 2,369,251 20,272 445,458 3,380,000,000 87,092 20,723 18,062 183,000,000 20,900,000 21,900,000,000 
50th 40 2,945,106 2,616 1,150,263 61,300,000 26,528 11,489 7,128 Inf 1,064 1.090E+24 
50th 45 5,019,440 7,551 575,848 69,600,000 418,361 17,164 26,809 44,300,000 79,400,000 11,000,000,000 
50th 50 4,164,004 9,709 14,300,000 1,190,000,000 99,155 27,014 26,022 n/a Inf n/a 
50th 55 151,174 1,388 22,459 9,635 1,645 1,100 101 353,882 104,504 936,000,000 
50th All 1,699,798 8,242 361,900 70,300,000 11,326 5,713 6,202 808,779 647,261 588,000,000 
Obs  6,059 5,006 5,377 866 2,267 2,181 1,049 1,702 2,459 890 
Notes: Unit of shadow prices is U.S. dollars at nominal price. n/a denotes there is no obs.  
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Table 7. Regression result 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
b Energy Cons. Electricity use Water use Paper cons. Scope 1 Scope 1+2 Scope 1+2+3 SOx NOx VOC 
Indep. variable 
OM
mi  
OM
mi  
OM
mi  
OM
mi  
OM
mi  
OM
mi  
OM
mi  
OM
mi  
OM
mi  
OM
mi  
EEPol −3.230 9.933 0.552 −2.768 −0.128 −0.027 −0.352 −3.345 0.087 0.541 
 
(3.217) (8.562) (1.898) (2.676) (0.110) (0.062) (0.284) (3.543) (0.158) (0.464) 
EQM −0.825 0.573 −0.431 −0.538 −0.070 0.009 −0.111 1.417 −0.168 −0.200 
 
(0.851) (2.158) (0.464) (0.601) (0.054) (0.035) (0.111) (1.469) (0.151) (0.151) 
GBPol 0.231 1.974 0.419 −0.618 0.149** 0.045 −0.165 1.139 0.252 −0.542* 
 
(0.290) (1.275) (0.489) (0.794) (0.074) (0.040) (0.127) (1.195) (0.226) (0.283) 
SPack 0.496 −2.744 0.588 −0.322 0.106 0.028 0.049 0.355 0.423 0.134 
 
(0.515) (3.475) (0.649) (0.718) (0.078) (0.046) (0.058) (0.382) (0.420) (0.109) 
EnvSCPol −1.038 4.383 0.630 1.068 0.077 0.015 0.212 3.970 −0.354 −0.071 
 
(0.956) (4.083) (0.641) (1.189) (0.122) (0.036) (0.128) (4.209) (0.375) (0.185) 
WastePol −1.020 0.795 −0.634 2.089 0.115 0.062 0.325 −3.908 0.258 0.091 
 
(1.010) (1.714) (1.145) (1.633) (0.134) (0.063) (0.197) (4.125) (0.455) (0.095) 
GHGini 7.004 −5.657 2.944 1.015 0.166 0.119 0.409 −3.980 −0.079 0.151 
 
(6.631) (6.133) (2.017) (1.347) (0.103) (0.087) (0.326) (4.461) (0.157) (0.156) 
GHGPol 0.320 −0.802 0.206 0.313 −0.158** −0.040 −0.127 6.211 −0.217 0.013 
 
(0.209) (1.655) (0.390) (0.614) (0.074) (0.032) (0.138) (6.117) (0.215) (0.087) 
Constant −1.491 −8.696 −3.388 −1.200 0.088 0.122* −0.166 0.022 0.213 −0.404 
 
(1.584) (7.007) (2.633) (1.186) (0.108) (0.073) (0.132) (0.746) (0.260) (0.550) 
Obs 6042 4998 5368 865 2256 2172 1047 1700 2452 888 
(# of clusters) 134 131 130 75 130 128 109 68 85 56 
F value 0.66 0.60 1.50 0.49 1.47 1.25 2.29** 0.23 0.58 0.89 
R-squared 0.0068 0.0024 0.0034 0.0103 0.0039 0.0092 0.0454 0.0072 0.0009 0.0206 
Notes: All columns shows results of regression model. **, and * denote significances at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. Coefficients are without 
parentheses, and cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses where GICS sub-industry classification is used as cluster (see Supplementary material 
Table S.1).
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Appendix 
Fukuyama and Weber (2008) claim that the supporting hyperplanes of dual 
variables in the DEA specification are not necessarily unique to an efficient observation, 
so there might be multiple supporting hyperplanes. They also provide a procedure to 
estimate the upper and lower bounds on the shadow price of the undesirable 
input/output by solving a series of fractional programming problems. In addition to 
DEA, there could be multiple supporting hyperplanes of dual variables (u,v,q) in the 
order-m method, and we apply their procedure to the order-m method in the following 
paragraphs.  
From the solutions to equation (24), we obtain 
1 1
ref ref ref
D D
k k k
i d i d i d
d d
u y u
 
  , 
1 1
ref ref ref
D D
j j j
i d i d i d
d d
v x v
 
  , and 
1 1
ref ref ref
D D
l l l
i d i d i d
d d
q b q
 
  , which are a set of (x,y,b) of a 
pseudo-reference DMU (i.e., a D-times weight-averaged reference DMU) for a certain 
DMU, i, and  * * *, ,x y bi i i   , which is a set of inefficiencies from equations (33), (34), 
and (35). We let  * * *, ,ref ref refi i ix y b  denote a set of (x,y,b) of a pseudo-reference DMU, and 
re-estimate a set of pseudo reference dual variables (i.e., refiu , refiv , refiq ), given 
 * * *, ,ref ref refi i ix y b  and  * * *, ,x y bi i i   . Following Fukuyama and Weber (2008), the upper 
bound for the undesirable input/output shadow price is the solution to the following 
fractional programming problem:  
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 s.t.      * * * * * *
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Applying the transformation procedure of Charnes and Cooper (1962), the 
fractional programming problem (equation (A.1)) could be converted to the LP problem. 
We restrict  1 , , ; , , 0ref x y b x y bi i i i i iiu x y b g g g     and set the following variables:  
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The LP problem for equation (A.1) is expressed as follows: 
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In a similar way, the lower bound of the shadow price is calculated in the following LP 
problem:  
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Note that if  1 * * *, , ; , , 0ref x y b x y bi i i i i iiu x y b g g g    , either the upper bound equation 
(equation (A.11)) or the lower bound equation (equation (A.19)) could be infeasible. 
This would imply that the shadow price of 1
bp  is infinitely positive. 
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Supplementary material  
S1. A discussion about treatment of outliers within the Journal of Environmental 
Management 
 
The issue of outliers in DEA/FDH has been discussed at least two decades ago 
in the environmental management literature such as in the Journal of Environmental 
Management. Tyteca (1996) reviews that this issue is well known in DEA/FDH, and 
that there are two solutions; by simply ignoring outliers and by replacing the 
best-practice frontier by another one. After Tyteca (1996), the JEM has published at 
least 11 papers examining environmental performance using usual DEA/FDH at firm or 
farm level, which is likely to have more indistinguishable outliers than at country or 
municipality level. Among them, 5 studies refer to and deal with outliers (or make sure 
there is no outlier) of their dataset (Frija et al., 2011; Gadanakis et al., 2015; Lundgren 
et al., 2013; Picazo-Tadeo and Prior, 2009; Van Meensel et al., 2010); 1 study only 
refers to the problem of outlier (Barnes, 2006); 5 studies do not refer to outliers (Barnes 
et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2012; De Koeijer et al., 2002; Oude Lansink and Bezlepkin, 
2003; Picazo-Tadeo et al., 2011). As Tyteca mentions, the best practice frontier is not 
considerably suited for the value of the indicator in itself but rather as a means to rank 
DMUs; therefore, some may justify estimation with potential super-efficient outliers 
because ranking DMU itself is important as a measure to improve environmental 
efficiency in the actual business situation. However, it will be beneficial for the value of 
the indicator to have options for sensitive analysis.  
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Supplementary material Table S.1. GICS Sector and sub-industry classification 
# GICS Sector obs Cluster: GICS Sub-Industry (#) 
10 Energy 339 Oil & Gas Drilling, Oil & Gas Equipment & Services, Integrated Oil & 
Gas, Oil & Gas Exploration & Production, Oil & Gas Refining & 
Marketing, Oil & Gas Storage & Transportation, Coal & Consumable 
Fuels (7) 
15 Materials 1334 Commodity Chemicals, Diversified Chemicals, Fertilizers & 
Agricultural Chemicals, Industrial Gases, Specialty Chemicals, 
Construction Materials, Metal & Glass Containers, Paper Packaging, 
Aluminum, Diversified Metals & Mining, Gold, Precious Metals & 
Minerals, Silver, Steel, Forest Products, Paper Products (16) 
20 Industrials 1764 Aerospace & Defense, Building Products, Construction & Engineering, 
Electrical Components & Equipment, Heavy Electrical Equipment, 
Industrial Conglomerates, Construction Machinery & Heavy Trucks, 
Agricultural & Farm Machinery, Industrial Machinery, Trading 
Companies & Distributors, Commercial Printing, Environmental & 
Facilities Services, Office Services & Supplies, Diversified Support 
Services, Security & Alarm Services, Human Resource & Employment 
Services, Research & Consulting Services, Air Freight & Logistics, 
Airlines, Marine, Railroads, Trucking, Airport Services, Highways & 
Railtracks, Marine Ports & Services (25) 
25 Consumer Discretionary 1141 Auto Parts & Equipment, Tires & Rubber, Automobile Manufacturers, 
Motorcycle Manufacturers, Consumer Electronics, Home Furnishings, 
Homebuilding, Household Appliances, Housewares & Specialties, 
Leisure Products, Apparel, Accessories & Luxury Goods, Footwear, 
Textiles, Casinos & Gaming, Hotels, Resorts & Cruise Lines, Leisure 
Facilities, Restaurants, Education Services, Specialized Consumer 
Services, Advertising, Broadcasting, Cable & Satellite, Movies & 
Entertainment, Publishing, Distributors, Catalog Retail, Department 
Stores, General Merchandise Stores, Apparel Retail, Computer & 
Electronics Retail, Home Improvement Retail, Specialty Stores, 
Automotive Retail, Homefurnishing Retail 
30 Consumer Staples 881 Drug Retail, Food Distributors, Food Retail, Hypermarkets & Super 
Centers, Brewers, Distillers & Vintners, Soft Drinks, Agricultural 
Products, Packaged Foods & Meats, Tobacco, Household Products, 
Personal Products (12) 
35 Health Care 466 Health Care Equipment, Health Care Supplies, Health Care Distributors, 
Health Care Services, Health Care Facilities, Managed Health Care, 
Biotechnology, Pharmaceuticals, Life Sciences Tools & Services (9) 
40 Financials 199 Diversified Banks, Regional Banks, Thrifts & Mortgage Finance, Other 
Diversified Financial Services, Multi-Sector Holdings, Specialized 
Finance, Consumer Finance, Asset Management & Custody Banks, 
Investment Banking & Brokerage, Diversified Capital Markets, Life & 
Health Insurance, Multi-line Insurance, Property & Casualty Insurance, 
Diversified REITs, Industrial REITs, Office REITs, Retail REITs, 
Specialized REITs, Diversified Real Estate Activities, Real Estate 
Operating Companies, Real Estate Development, Real Estate Services 
(22) 
45 Information Technology 918 Internet Software & Services, IT Consulting & Other Services, Data 
Processing & Outsourced Services, Application Software, Systems 
Software, Home Entertainment Software, Communications Equipment, 
Technology Hardware, Storage & Peripherals, Electronic Equipment & 
Instruments, Electronic Components, Electronic Manufacturing 
Services, Technology Distributors, Semiconductor Equipment, 
Semiconductors (14) 
50 Telecommunication 
Services 
142 Alternative Carriers, Integrated Telecommunication Services, Wireless 
Telecommunication Services (3) 
55 Utilities 185 Electric Utilities, Gas Utilities, Multi-Utilities, Water Utilities, 
Independent Power Producers & Energy Traders, Renewable Electricity 
(6) 
 All sectors 7369 (148) 
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Table S.2. Total number and net number of observations by sector and country in 2007-2013 
 Sector 
Country 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 Total 
 Total number of obs 
Saudi Arabia 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Argentina 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 
Australia 18 43 12 1 10 7 7 0 7 0 105 
Austria 6 3 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 
Belgium 0 9 0 5 10 7 0 0 9 0 40 
Botswana  0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
Brazil 10 36 17 12 19 1 6 6 8 47 162 
Colombia 5 2 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 5 16 
China 8 33 70 17 19 16 3 6 4 20 196 
Chile 0 10 4 0 5 0 0 0 0 18 37 
Canada 36 42 10 9 1 0 0 1 6 11 116 
Czech 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Croatia 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 
Denmark 0 18 14 7 8 28 0 0 0 0 75 
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Finland 0 16 18 6 12 6 0 15 0 0 73 
France 7 10 69 67 41 15 0 21 6 6 242 
Greece 10 17 14 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 47 
Germany 0 38 25 42 25 21 0 7 6 0 164 
Hungary 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 0 10 
Hong Kong 7 9 23 1 0 3 15 6 0 7 71 
Ireland 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 
Indonesia 4 19 0 6 3 0 0 0 0 3 35 
Italy 0 0 7 12 0 0 0 6 0 1 26 
India 0 2 4 1 0 0 4 15 0 2 28 
Israel 0 3 5 0 4 0 0 0 1 0 13 
Japan 59 616 993 579 366 172 49 491 14 5 3344 
Kenya 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 
Korea 0 19 7 4 3 0 0 5 0 1 39 
United Kingdom 37 96 154 144 57 29 77 37 11 18 660 
Malaysia 0 0 4 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 7 
Mexico 0 15 9 2 23 0 0 0 4 0 53 
Netherlands 1 26 9 16 18 0 0 6 0 0 76 
Norway 11 1 9 0 6 0 0 0 0 3 30 
New Zealand 0 1 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 
Pakistan 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 6 9 
Philippine 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 0 1 6 19 
Poland 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 15 
Russia 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
Romania 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
South Africa 9 62 25 26 26 11 0 0 7 0 166 
Sri Lanka 0 0 10 0 7 0 0 0 5 0 22 
Spain 0 0 2 7 0 1 0 0 0 0 10 
Singapore 0 0 6 0 2 0 10 0 4 0 22 
Sweden 1 6 74 32 24 4 4 9 11 0 165 
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 
Switzerland 0 0 16 1 6 17 0 6 0 0 46 
Thailand 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Turkey 0 7 4 8 9 0 0 0 2 1 31 
Taiwan 0 5 11 15 5 0 0 83 9 0 128 
Abu Dhabi 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
United States 88 118 115 102 154 105 12 198 16 15 923 
Virt-x (Switzerland/UK) 0 25 12 6 7 22 0 0 0 0 72 
Total 339 1334 1764 1141 881 466 199 918 142 185 7369 
 Net number of obs 
Saudi Arabia 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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Argentina 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Australia 4 14 5 1 3 1 2 0 1 0 31 
Austria 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Belgium 0 2 0 1 2 1 0 0 2 0 8 
Botswana  0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Brazil 2 12 7 5 5 1 3 2 3 22 62 
Colombia 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 4 
China 4 20 32 6 6 8 2 5 1 6 90 
Chile 0 3 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 4 10 
Canada 13 15 5 3 1 0 0 1 3 4 45 
Czech 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Croatia 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Denmark 0 3 3 2 2 5 0 0 0 0 15 
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Finland 0 4 4 1 2 1 0 3 0 0 15 
France 2 2 12 13 8 3 0 7 1 1 49 
Greece 2 5 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 
Germany 0 8 7 9 4 4 0 2 1 0 35 
Hungary 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 3 
Hong Kong 2 5 9 1 0 1 6 1 0 2 27 
Ireland 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Indonesia 1 5 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 9 
Italy 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 5 
India 0 1 2 1 0 0 2 5 0 1 12 
Israel 0 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 5 
Japan 10 110 187 112 65 31 8 92 2 5 622 
Kenya 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Korea 0 4 3 2 1 0 0 3 0 1 14 
United Kingdom 8 23 35 32 14 6 17 10 4 3 152 
Malaysia 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Mexico 0 5 4 1 7 0 0 0 2 0 19 
Netherlands 1 6 2 4 3 0 0 1 0 0 17 
Norway 2 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 7 
New Zealand 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 
Pakistan 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Philippine 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 1 2 7 
Poland 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 
Russia 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Romania 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
South Africa 2 17 8 9 6 3 0 0 2 0 47 
Sri Lanka 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 5 
Spain 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 
Singapore 0 0 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 6 
Sweden 1 1 13 8 5 2 1 2 2 0 35 
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 
Switzerland 0 0 3 1 2 4 0 1 0 0 11 
Thailand 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Turkey 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 1 1 10 
Taiwan 0 2 3 4 2 0 0 25 3 0 39 
Abu Dhabi 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
United States 24 32 40 36 37 28 4 55 4 12 272 
Virt-x (Switzerland/UK) 0 4 3 1 1 4 0 0 0 0 13 
Total 86 318 408 265 190 105 51 216 40 74 1753 
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Table S.3. The number of observations in each model 
 Undesirable input bin Undesirable output bout 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Sector Energy Cons. Electricity use Water use Paper cons. Scope 1 Scope 1+2 Scope 1+2+3 SOx NOx VOC 
10 241 145 169 14 187 162 48 126 197 127 
15 1,152 740 992 38 351 333 104 541 747 248 
20 1,475 1,309 1,263 251 408 398 213 312 442 186 
25 898 766 793 199 349 329 191 184 254 119 
30 747 640 693 83 283 277 118 184 248 21 
35 434 348 403 40 145 144 72 144 205 114 
40 149 115 145 26 92 92 37 1 11 4 
45 714 744 710 142 311 309 173 189 254 65 
50 118 120 97 58 70 71 50 0 1 0 
55 131 79 112 15 71 66 43 21 100 6 
All 6,059 5,006 5,377 866 2,267 2,181 1,049 1,702 2,459 890 
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Table S.4. Descriptive statistics by sector 
Sector Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
10 Gross profit 339 8,960,000,000 16,700,000,000 10,800,000 84,000,000,000 
10 Labor 339 20,173 27,127 18 118,000 
10 Capital stock 339 29,300,000,000 49,900,000,000 17,600,000 276,000,000,000 
10 Energy cons. 241  50,491  90,658  6.2  430,556  
10 Electricity use 145  1,463,979  2,626,808  904.7  10,400,000  
10 Water use 169  128,043  293,021  20.1  1,370,400  
10 Paper cons. 14  1  1  0.1  2  
10 Scope 1 187  20,700,000  30,900,000  3,064.0  141,000,000  
10 Scope 1+2 162  21,700,000,000  32,700,000,000  25,700,000.0  150,000,000,000  
10 Scope 1+2+3 48  200,000,000,000  285,000,000,000  30,300,000.0  775,000,000,000  
10 SOx 126  40,562  62,898  1.0  241,000  
10 NOx 197  51,065  75,724  10.0  468,000  
10 VOC 127  51  81  0.1  310  
15 Gross profit 1,334 1,630,000,000 3,010,000,000 2,155,520 35,700,000,000 
15 Labor 1,334 15,255 27,665 9 315,867 
15 Capital stock 1,334 4,720,000,000 9,230,000,000 1,582,198 79,900,000,000 
15 Energy cons. 1,152  17,074  48,445  0.5  712,500  
15 Electricity use 740  2,936,481  11,300,000  119.0  251,000,000  
15 Water use 992  206,653  601,270  6.8  5,839,923  
15 Paper cons. 38  1,626  5,193  0.1  24,000  
15 Scope 1 351  6,679,200  17,800,000  6,908.0  203,000,000  
15 Scope 1+2 333  9,710,000,000  21,500,000,000  12,100,000.0  227,000,000,000  
15 Scope 1+2+3 104  26,900,000,000  62,300,000,000  18,100,000.0  326,000,000,000  
15 SOx 541  48,454  355,262  0.1  3,189,997  
15 NOx 747  99,899  900,013  0.5  11,200,000  
15 VOC 248  38  540  0.1  8,500  
20 Gross profit 1,764 1,900,000,000 4,610,000,000 2,003,072 69,700,000,000 
20 Labor 1,764 27,838 60,122 22 648,254 
20 Capital stock 1,764 3,230,000,000 8,220,000,000 2,377,873 95,000,000,000 
20 Energy cons. 1,475  3,178  9,915  0.2  75,512  
20 Electricity use 1,309  450,474  1,329,287  0.7  13,900,000  
20 Water use 1,263  9,392  65,940  3.7  1,163,000  
20 Paper cons. 251  85  537  0.1  6,835  
20 Scope 1 408  1,092,675  3,368,441  7.0  25,500,000  
20 Scope 1+2 398  1,370,000,000  3,680,000,000  1,627,200.0  25,600,000,000  
20 Scope 1+2+3 213  1,560,000,000  3,720,000,000  9,250,000.0  22,500,000,000  
20 SOx 312  21,698  76,783  0.1  519,000  
20 NOx 442  23,019  86,258  0.1  561,049  
20 VOC 186  2  5  0.1  41  
25 Gross profit 1,141 3,720,000,000 6,250,000,000 20,300,000 45,000,000,000 
25 Labor 1,141 42,647 73,355 122 549,763 
25 Capital stock 1,141 5,660,000,000 13,500,000,000 241,694 125,000,000,000 
25 Energy cons. 898  2,608  8,702  1.1  115,376  
25 Electricity use 766  1,136,203  11,200,000  79.3  222,000,000  
25 Water use 793  19,945  181,033  0.6  3,026,185  
25 Paper cons. 199  24  52  0.1  300  
25 Scope 1 349  193,749  479,453  87.0  6,876,984  
25 Scope 1+2 329  647,000,000  1,120,000,000  302,000.0  7,990,000,000  
25 Scope 1+2+3 191  1,510,000,000  4,370,000,000  1,316,000.0  33,900,000,000  
25 SOx 184  1,715  7,980  0.1  59,735  
25 NOx 254  9,922  49,033  0.1  361,220  
25 VOC 119  4  7  0.1  35  
30 Gross profit 881 4,700,000,000 7,800,000,000 6,962,204 53,100,000,000 
30 Labor 881 42,110 74,837 106 495,287 
30 Capital stock 881 3,850,000,000 6,500,000,000 7,270,000 49,200,000,000 
30 Energy cons. 747  3,287  6,947  0.6  76,854  
30 Electricity use 640  1,018,291  2,472,756  86.8  22,600,000  
30 Water use 693  17,334  40,338  2.1  313,000  
30 Paper cons. 83  37  64  0.1  271  
30 Scope 1 283  712,211  955,155  38.0  4,130,000  
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30 Scope 1+2 277  1,590,000,000  1,960,000,000  147,000.0  7,800,000,000  
30 Scope 1+2+3 118  2,900,000,000  5,700,000,000  9,300,000.0  29,800,000,000  
30 SOx 184  1,058  3,220  0.1  21,400  
30 NOx 248  801  1,484  0.1  7,087  
30 VOC 21  0.2  0.1  0.1  1  
35 Gross profit 466 6,470,000,000 10,100,000,000 31,000,000 53,200,000,000 
35 Labor 466 23,696 32,411 498 178,337 
35 Capital stock 466 3,570,000,000 5,620,000,000 42,600,000 25,200,000,000 
35 Energy cons. 434  1,403  3,367  1.8  32,622  
35 Electricity use 348  498,161  1,052,162  882.8  7,273,056  
35 Water use 403  14,563  53,979  2.9  474,000  
35 Paper cons. 40  63  213  0.1  802  
35 Scope 1 145  445,369  959,841  547.0  5,590,000  
35 Scope 1+2 144  907,000,000  1,730,000,000  3,046,000.0  9,300,000,000  
35 Scope 1+2+3 72  1,120,000,000  1,170,000,000  15,200,000.0  4,700,000,000  
35 SOx 144  253  679  0.1  3,600  
35 NOx 205  274  635  0.2  4,000  
35 VOC 114  1  1  0.1  5  
40 Gross profit 199 925,000,000 1,050,000,000 795,165 5,030,000,000 
40 Labor 199 9,750 19,642 2 125,000 
40 Capital stock 199 6,430,000,000 7,600,000,000 1,357,376 30,000,000,000 
40 Energy cons. 149  4,310  13,322  0.1  68,609  
40 Electricity use 115  384,208  570,955  76.1  3,339,252  
40 Water use 145  5,584  25,033  2.5  213,371  
40 Paper cons. 26  1  0.4  0.1  1  
40 Scope 1 92  1,061,766  3,809,192  1.8  16,400,000  
40 Scope 1+2 92  1,170,000,000  3,920,000,000  396,000.0  16,900,000,000  
40 Scope 1+2+3 37  78,500,000  102,000,000  536,500.0  306,000,000  
40 SOx 1  3,963  . 3,963.4  3,963  
40 NOx 11  1,246  2,169  0.8  7,346  
40 VOC 4  2  3  0.3  7  
45 Gross profit 918 3,440,000,000 7,640,000,000 1,817,664 69,200,000,000 
45 Labor 918 35,234 62,564 349 434,246 
45 Capital stock 918 2,800,000,000 6,560,000,000 1,011,812 91,600,000,000 
45 Energy cons. 714  7,057  147,328  0.5  3,936,340  
45 Electricity use 744  640,611  1,311,795  169.9  15,000,000  
45 Water use 710  8,566  27,793  0.2  280,027  
45 Paper cons. 142  14  47  0.1  320  
45 Scope 1 311  147,324  403,417  3.7  4,045,000  
45 Scope 1+2 309  576,000,000  1,130,000,000  1,465,300.0  11,300,000,000  
45 Scope 1+2+3 173  1,690,000,000  6,930,000,000  2,876,500.0  78,700,000,000  
45 SOx 189  143  338  0.1  2,300  
45 NOx 254  682  2,422  0.1  16,550  
45 VOC 65  0.4  0.4  0.1  2  
50 Gross profit 142 17,100,000,000 21,500,000,000 121,000,000 77,500,000,000 
50 Labor 142 63,978 83,560 1,244 281,000 
50 Capital stock 142 35,500,000,000 49,500,000,000 573,000,000 234,000,000,000 
50 Energy cons. 118  3,037  6,870  17.9  66,775  
50 Electricity use 120  2,592,257  3,678,631  7.9  14,600,000  
50 Water use 97  2,980  5,526  34.7  26,390  
50 Paper cons. 58  84  517  0.1  3,948  
50 Scope 1 70  135,994  269,585  620.0  1,170,232  
50 Scope 1+2 71  1,040,000,000  2,130,000,000  2,650,000.0  9,080,000,000  
50 Scope 1+2+3 50  1,130,000,000  2,500,000,000  4,310,000.0  9,140,000,000  
50 SOx 0      
50 NOx 1  3,290  . 3,290.0  3,290  
50 VOC 0      
55 Gross profit 185 2,480,000,000 2,920,000,000 39,100,000 17,500,000,000 
55 Labor 185 17,981 50,965 40 336,013 
55 Capital stock 185 9,160,000,000 10,300,000,000 15,800,000 76,800,000,000 
55 Energy cons. 131  61,729  91,786  0.5  610,841  
55 Electricity use 79  4,808,531  26,200,000  20.6  229,000,000  
55 Water use 112  1,180,556  3,830,388  12.2  36,500,000  
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55 Paper cons. 15  0.4  0.3  0.1  1  
55 Scope 1 71  11,600,000  16,400,000  1,634.4  60,000,000  
55 Scope 1+2 66  12,600,000,000  17,700,000,000  2,614,800.0  60,200,000,000  
55 Scope 1+2+3 43  15,400,000,000  19,300,000,000  3,352,000.0  60,200,000,000  
55 SOx 21  29,668  38,775  1.1  121,239  
55 NOx 100  22,175  30,558  1.9  246,562  
55 VOC 6  0.3  0.3  0.1  1  
 
Notes:  
Gross profit denotes sales minus cost of goods sold (U.S. dollars at nominal price). Labor denotes 
the number of employees (persons). Capital stock is estimated by benchmark year method where 
bench mark year is 2005. Unit of energy consumption and electricity use is megawatt hour (MWh). 
Unit of water use is cubic meter. Units of paper consumption, scope 1/1+2/1+2+3, SOx, NOx, and 
VOC are metric ton. EEPol, EQM, GBPol, SPack, ESCPol, WRPol, GHGini, and GHGPol denote 
dummy variables of ESG activities (see Supplementary material Table S.6). Table 1 shows 
descriptive statistics in all sectors.  
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Table S.5. Correlation table of all sectors 
 Gross 
profit 
Labor Capital 
stock 
Energy 
cons. 
Elec. 
use 
Water 
use 
Paper 
cons. 
Scope 1 Scope 
1+2 
Scope 
1+2+3 
SOx NOx VOC 
Gross profit 1.000  
     
       
Labor 0.617  1.000  
    
       
Capital stock 0.752  0.415  1.000  
   
       
Energy cons. 0.180  0.113  0.309  1.000  
  
       
Elec. use 0.150  0.149  0.176  0.162  1.000  
 
       
Water use 0.052  0.081  0.100  0.174  0.248  1.000         
Paper cons. -0.019  -0.011  -0.009  -0.010  0.048  0.112  1.000        
Scope 1 0.437  0.114  0.681  0.959  0.437  0.412  -0.026  1.000       
Scope 1+2 0.402  0.144  0.661  0.959  0.578  0.410  -0.006  0.992  1.000      
Scope 1+2+3 0.565  0.077  0.805  0.702  0.410  0.586  0.092  0.701  0.708  1.000     
SOx 0.051  0.031  0.148  0.037  0.036  0.554  -0.042  0.632  0.581  0.502  1.000    
NOx 0.031  0.035  0.098  0.029  0.032  0.213  -0.021  0.724  0.688  0.856  0.953  1.000   
VOC 0.051  -0.010  0.087  0.784  0.093  0.001  0.953  0.828  0.778  0.947  0.717  0.762  1.000  
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Table S.6. Description of variable for the second step 
Long name Name Description 
For energy use   
Energy efficiency policy EEPol Indicates whether the company has implemented any initiatives to 
make its use of energy more efficient. 
For environmental quality   
Env. quality management EQM Indicates whether the company has introduced any kind of 
environmental quality management and/or environmental management 
system to help reduce the environmental footprint of its operations. 
Green building policy GBPol Indicates whether the company has taken any steps towards using 
environmental technologies and/or environmental principles in the 
design and construction of its buildings. 
Sustainable packaging SPack Indicates whether the company has taken any steps to make its 
packaging more environmentally friendly. This might include efforts to 
improve the recyclability of packaging, to use less environmentally 
damaging materials in packaging etc.  
Env. supply chain policy EnvSCPol Indicates whether the company has implemented any initiatives to 
reduce the environmental footprint of its supply chain. Environmental 
footprint reductions could be achieved by reducing waste, by reducing 
resource use, by reducing environmental emissions, by insisting on the 
introduction of environmental management systems etc. in the supply 
chain.  
Waste reduction policy WastePol Indicates whether the company has implemented any initiatives to 
reduce the waste generated during the course of its operations. 
For GHG emissions   
GHG reduction initiatives GHGIni Indicates whether the company has implemented any initiatives to 
reduce its environmental emissions to air.  
GHG reduction policy GHGPol Indicates whether the company has outlined its intention to help reduce 
global emissions of the GHGs that cause climate change through its 
ongoing operations and/or the use of its products and services. 
Examples might include efforts to reduce GHG emissions, efforts to 
improve energy efficiency, efforts to derive energy from cleaner fuel 
sources, investment in product development to reduce emissions 
generated or energy consumed in the use of the company's products etc.  
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Table S.7. Result of coefficient in parametric LP specification 
 (1) Energy consumption 
 (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4) (1.5) (1.6) (1.7) (1.8) (1.9) (1.10) 
#Industry #10 #15 #20 #25 #30 #35 #40 #45 #50 #55 
Objective value 8.59E+07 5.52E+07 7.63E+07 6.67E+07 9.32E+07 7.93E+07 8.54E+06 8.37E+07 7.77E+07 2.23E+07 
Constant (α) 2.16E+04 −1.36E+01 −1.30E+01 3.44E+00 −5.85E−01 −2.18E+02 −3.69E+00 −4.38E+00 1.35E+04 2.23E+03 
α1 2.65E−01 −2.02E−02 3.41E−02 8.40E−04 1.28E−03 3.35E−01 4.84E−01 3.34E−03 −1.70E−01 −2.68E−01 
α2 4.05E−06 3.38E−07 4.17E−07 5.97E−08 −1.48E−09 2.38E−06 4.90E−07 1.71E−07 1.07E−05 −1.42E−07 
β1 −1.35E−05 −4.19E−09 3.98E−09 −4.34E−08 −1.90E−09 −2.10E−06 −1.51E−06 −1.24E−08 −1.68E−05 2.59E−07 
γ1 9.86E−01 1.00E+00 1.00E+00 1.00E+00 1.00E+00 9.98E−01 9.98E−01 1.00E+00 9.83E−01 1.00E+00 
α11 −3.40E−05 8.85E−08 −1.82E−07 −4.97E−08 −2.27E−08 −2.76E−05 −8.35E−06 −7.14E−08 −6.42E−05 −3.17E−05 
α12 6.61E−11 4.96E−13 1.99E−11 5.08E−14 4.54E−13 1.46E−10 1.39E−11 1.64E−12 1.09E−10 3.19E−10 
α21 6.61E−11 4.96E−13 1.99E−11 5.08E−14 4.54E−13 1.46E−10 1.39E−11 1.64E−12 1.09E−10 3.19E−10 
α22 −1.14E−16 −7.87E−18 −8.90E−18 1.23E−18 −6.92E−18 −1.27E−15 −7.51E−18 −1.39E−17 −3.52E−16 −9.28E−17 
β11 −1.52E−15 −2.08E−16 −1.38E−16 −7.38E−18 −6.79E−18 −6.24E−16 4.17E−16 −1.86E−17 −2.63E−16 −8.09E−15 
γ11 −1.52E−09 −2.08E−10 −1.38E−10 −7.38E−12 −6.79E−12 −6.24E−10 4.17E−10 −1.86E−11 −2.63E−10 −8.09E−09 
ε11 1.59E−10 2.65E−12 8.15E−13 8.06E−13 −2.14E−13 7.05E−11 1.92E−11 −2.80E−13 6.18E−11 1.98E−10 
ε21 2.57E−16 −3.13E−17 −2.45E−16 −6.99E−18 2.80E−18 2.50E−16 −8.13E−16 1.83E−18 5.87E−17 −1.97E−17 
η11 1.59E−07 2.65E−09 8.15E−10 8.06E−10 −2.14E−10 7.05E−08 1.92E−08 −2.80E−10 6.18E−08 1.98E−07 
η21 2.57E−13 −3.13E−14 −2.45E−13 −6.99E−15 2.80E−15 2.50E−13 −8.13E−13 1.83E−15 5.87E−14 −1.97E−14 
ρ11 −1.52E−12 −2.08E−13 −1.38E−13 −7.38E−15 −6.79E−15 −6.24E−13 4.17E−13 −1.86E−14 −2.63E−13 −8.09E−12 
obs 241 1152 1475 898 747 434 149 714 118 131 
 (2) Electricity use 
 (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4) (2.5) (2.6) (2.7) (2.8) (2.9) (2.10) 
#Industry #10 #15 #20 #25 #30 #35 #40 #45 #50 #55 
Objective value 1.40E+08 8.43E+08 1.91E+08 1.94E+08 2.86E+08 9.67E+07 1.76E+07 1.35E+08 1.07E+08 5.60E+07 
Constant (α) 4.82E+04 −3.52E+03 −5.30E+02 −2.90E+03 −1.38E+03 −1.01E+03 −8.55E+02 −5.86E+01 3.80E+04 4.86E+05 
α1 2.96E+01 4.72E+01 3.47E−01 1.84E+00 1.12E+01 1.92E+00 2.48E+01 1.33E−01 2.49E+01 −1.47E+01 
α2 3.99E−05 −1.85E−05 4.17E−06 4.66E−05 −2.11E−05 2.20E−05 3.36E−07 1.53E−05 −1.31E−05 3.91E−05 
β1 −2.64E−04 −2.20E−04 −1.01E−08 −1.80E−07 −1.33E−07 −3.10E−05 −1.20E−04 −1.82E−05 −8.26E−05 −4.34E−04 
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γ1 7.36E−01 7.80E−01 1.00E+00 1.00E+00 1.00E+00 9.69E−01 8.80E−01 9.82E−01 9.17E−01 5.66E−01 
α11 −7.30E−04 −1.10E−03 −1.50E−06 −1.03E−05 2.79E−05 −1.87E−04 −1.18E−03 −1.67E−06 −2.34E−04 −5.31E−04 
α12 1.08E−09 1.37E−09 2.70E−11 −5.72E−11 −3.62E−10 2.12E−09 −1.67E−10 4.14E−11 2.55E−10 8.70E−09 
α21 1.08E−09 1.37E−09 2.70E−11 −5.72E−11 −3.62E−10 2.12E−09 −1.67E−10 4.14E−11 2.55E−10 8.70E−09 
α22 −2.26E−15 8.31E−15 3.00E−16 −1.44E−15 3.11E−15 −2.86E−14 1.05E−15 −1.43E−15 −3.14E−16 −5.25E−15 
β11 −2.16E−14 −6.10E−15 −4.96E−15 −8.76E−15 −2.06E−15 −6.07E−15 −1.18E−13 −1.57E−15 −8.20E−16 −4.95E−15 
γ11 −2.16E−08 −6.10E−09 −4.96E−09 −8.76E−09 −2.06E−09 −6.07E−09 −1.18E−07 −1.57E−09 −8.20E−10 −4.95E−09 
ε11 −7.99E−10 1.13E−09 2.51E−11 6.98E−11 −6.13E−10 −2.74E−10 7.02E−09 −3.42E−11 −4.55E−10 −1.04E−10 
ε21 6.18E−15 −1.06E−14 −2.48E−15 1.24E−15 1.31E−15 8.98E−15 −6.96E−15 9.34E−16 3.15E−16 1.13E−15 
η11 −7.99E−07 1.13E−06 2.51E−08 6.98E−08 −6.13E−07 −2.74E−07 7.02E−06 −3.42E−08 −4.55E−07 −1.04E−07 
η21 6.18E−12 −1.06E−11 −2.48E−12 1.24E−12 1.31E−12 8.98E−12 −6.96E−12 9.34E−13 3.15E−13 1.13E−12 
ρ11 −2.16E−11 −6.10E−12 −4.96E−12 −8.76E−12 −2.06E−12 −6.07E−12 −1.18E−10 −1.57E−12 −8.20E−13 −4.95E−12 
obs 145 740 1309 766 640 348 115 744 120 79 
 (3) Water use 
 (3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) (3.5) (3.6) (3.7) (3.8) (3.9) (3.10) 
#Industry #10 #15 #20 #25 #30 #35 #40 #45 #50 #55 
Objective value 3.70E+07 1.05E+08 4.01E+07 6.20E+07 9.69E+07 7.29E+07 7.92E+06 6.49E+07 8.40E+07 5.33E+07 
Constant (α) −1.88E+03 −2.73E+02 −9.51E+00 −1.63E+01 −2.96E+00 5.70E+02 −8.75E+01 6.07E−01 −2.72E+03 4.65E+04 
α1 1.18E+00 1.20E+00 1.68E−02 4.54E−02 3.25E−02 5.45E−01 3.48E−01 −2.35E−04 2.70E+00 −7.65E+00 
α2 1.19E−06 9.58E−07 1.39E−07 −2.58E−08 3.26E−07 4.03E−06 4.62E−07 8.52E−08 1.51E−05 −1.56E−05 
β1 −1.17E−06 −7.72E−07 −3.96E−08 −2.48E−08 −7.33E−08 −3.96E−06 −1.12E−06 −9.63E−09 −3.03E−05 8.01E−06 
γ1 9.99E−01 9.99E−01 1.00E+00 1.00E+00 1.00E+00 9.96E−01 9.99E−01 1.00E+00 9.70E−01 1.01E+00 
α11 −3.49E−05 −3.10E−05 −4.61E−07 −2.24E−07 −9.02E−07 −3.00E−05 −6.05E−06 6.96E−09 −1.02E−04 −1.28E−04 
α12 3.85E−11 9.06E−11 5.83E−12 2.64E−13 1.39E−11 2.93E−10 1.07E−11 3.41E−13 1.13E−10 4.99E−09 
α21 3.85E−11 9.06E−11 5.83E−12 2.64E−13 1.39E−11 2.93E−10 1.07E−11 3.41E−13 1.13E−10 4.99E−09 
α22 −4.67E−17 −1.44E−16 −2.66E−18 −1.77E−18 −1.63E−16 −3.07E−15 −1.48E−17 −4.99E−18 −3.71E−16 −2.45E−15 
β11 −1.89E−15 −5.17E−15 −1.27E−17 −9.02E−17 −1.72E−16 −6.66E−16 3.12E−16 −1.03E−17 −3.51E−16 −4.24E−14 
γ11 −1.89E−09 −5.17E−09 −1.27E−11 −9.02E−11 −1.72E−10 −6.66E−10 3.12E−10 −1.03E−11 −3.51E−10 −4.24E−08 
ε11 2.62E−11 2.60E−11 9.39E−13 7.98E−13 −5.50E−13 −8.59E−12 1.44E−11 −3.06E−13 1.40E−10 −2.04E−09 
ε21 1.46E−16 4.85E−18 −1.00E−16 5.08E−18 3.55E−17 8.38E−16 −6.21E−16 1.65E−18 3.58E−17 3.11E−15 
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η11 2.62E−08 2.60E−08 9.39E−10 7.98E−10 −5.50E−10 −8.59E−09 1.44E−08 −3.06E−10 1.40E−07 −2.04E−06 
η21 1.46E−13 4.85E−15 −1.00E−13 5.08E−15 3.55E−14 8.38E−13 −6.21E−13 1.65E−15 3.58E−14 3.11E−12 
ρ11 −1.89E−12 −5.17E−12 −1.27E−14 −9.02E−14 −1.72E−13 −6.66E−13 3.12E−13 −1.03E−14 −3.51E−13 −4.24E−11 
obs 169 992 1263 793 693 403 145 710 97 112 
 (4) Paper consumption 
 (4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4) (4.5) (4.6) (4.7) (4.8) (4.9) (4.10) 
#Industry #10 #15 #20 #25 #30 #35 #40 #45 #50 #55 
Objective value 3.38E+05 1.81E+06 1.36E+07 2.95E+07 2.15E+07 5.17E+06 9.07E+05 1.92E+07 4.21E+07 3.76E+05 
Constant (α) 3.82E+05 5.44E+04 −6.00E+02 −3.80E+02 −6.62E+03 7.41E+04 −4.32E+04 −7.63E+02 3.97E+04 3.69E+05 
α1 −3.24E+01 −1.75E+01 1.23E+00 7.05E−01 1.54E+01 −5.56E+01 5.29E+01 9.42E−01 2.74E+00 −8.16E+00 
α2 8.51E−05 −1.69E−05 1.38E−06 2.76E−06 8.84E−05 1.19E−04 5.89E−05 7.23E−06 1.90E−05 −1.36E−04 
β1 −6.74E−04 −3.86E−06 7.10E−08 −4.48E−07 −1.03E−04 1.91E−05 −3.74E−04 −1.65E−06 −3.25E−05 −2.37E−04 
γ1 3.26E−01 9.96E−01 1.00E+00 1.00E+00 8.97E−01 1.02E+00 6.26E−01 9.98E−01 9.67E−01 7.63E−01 
α11 4.49E−03 1.59E−03 7.66E−06 1.89E−05 2.11E−04 4.29E−03 −4.22E−03 −8.83E−06 −1.89E−04 −3.94E−03 
α12 8.90E−09 2.13E−09 5.00E−11 −2.26E−10 −1.33E−09 3.24E−08 3.95E−09 −4.22E−11 −6.56E−10 −1.18E−08 
α21 8.90E−09 2.13E−09 5.00E−11 −2.26E−10 −1.33E−09 3.24E−08 3.95E−09 −4.22E−11 −6.56E−10 −1.18E−08 
α22 2.70E−14 −4.62E−15 −3.21E−16 1.51E−15 −4.65E−15 −1.99E−13 −7.32E−16 −2.60E−15 3.73E−16 3.78E−14 
β11 1.24E−12 1.68E−15 −3.02E−15 −3.46E−15 −2.85E−14 −4.65E−14 2.61E−14 −7.24E−15 −7.58E−15 −2.89E−13 
γ11 1.24E−06 1.68E−09 −3.02E−09 −3.46E−09 −2.85E−08 −4.65E−08 2.61E−08 −7.24E−09 −7.58E−09 −2.89E−07 
ε11 −4.50E−08 −1.27E−09 −5.61E−10 1.79E−10 −2.42E−09 1.60E−09 1.40E−08 −1.76E−11 1.24E−09 4.06E−08 
ε21 −2.00E−13 2.93E−15 7.37E−16 −6.71E−16 3.35E−14 3.18E−15 −4.67E−14 1.95E−15 1.36E−15 1.82E−14 
η11 −4.50E−05 −1.27E−06 −5.61E−07 1.79E−07 −2.42E−06 1.60E−06 1.40E−05 −1.76E−08 1.24E−06 4.06E−05 
η21 −2.00E−10 2.93E−12 7.37E−13 −6.71E−13 3.35E−11 3.18E−12 −4.67E−11 1.95E−12 1.36E−12 1.82E−11 
ρ11 1.24E−09 1.68E−12 −3.02E−12 −3.46E−12 −2.85E−11 −4.65E−11 2.61E−11 −7.24E−12 −7.58E−12 −2.89E−10 
obs 14 38 251 199 83 40 26 142 58 15 
 (5) Scope 1 
 (5.1) (5.2) (5.3) (5.4) (5.5) (5.6) (5.7) (5.8) (5.9) (5.10) 
#Industry #10 #15 #20 #25 #30 #35 #40 #45 #50 #55 
Objective value 9.09E+08 7.20E+08 2.54E+08 4.29E+07 1.25E+08 6.71E+07 1.19E+07 9.74E+07 4.36E+07 1.02E+08 
Constant (α) −4.87E+04 −3.80E+04 1.01E+03 3.82E+02 3.49E+02 −1.14E+02 4.30E+04 −3.27E+02 −1.70E+04 6.27E+05 
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α1 1.14E+01 1.87E+02 2.33E+00 2.64E−01 8.42E−01 9.00E−01 1.50E+01 7.18E−02 7.58E−01 −2.38E+01 
α2 −1.44E−06 1.44E−04 5.14E−06 1.51E−06 6.89E−06 4.69E−06 −1.23E−05 1.06E−06 3.50E−05 −2.04E−05 
β1 −5.85E−05 −7.45E−04 −1.84E−05 −2.64E−06 −7.93E−06 −5.10E−06 2.44E−06 −3.41E−07 −3.45E−05 −3.75E−04 
γ1 9.42E−01 2.55E−01 9.82E−01 9.97E−01 9.92E−01 9.95E−01 1.00E+00 1.00E+00 9.66E−01 6.25E−01 
α11 −3.78E−04 −4.87E−03 −9.78E−06 −3.42E−06 3.06E−08 −9.39E−05 −5.97E−04 −1.08E−06 −1.23E−03 −1.42E−03 
α12 2.12E−09 −2.11E−10 6.03E−10 −9.05E−12 1.31E−10 2.53E−10 1.76E−09 2.28E−11 1.22E−09 5.27E−09 
α21 2.12E−09 −2.11E−10 6.03E−10 −9.05E−12 1.31E−10 2.53E−10 1.76E−09 2.28E−11 1.22E−09 5.27E−09 
α22 −2.96E−15 1.64E−15 −2.47E−15 −3.69E−17 −2.92E−15 −3.22E−15 1.84E−15 −2.28E−16 −5.45E−16 9.57E−16 
β11 −5.22E−15 −1.17E−14 −6.10E−15 −6.06E−16 −3.51E−15 −3.33E−15 −6.48E−14 −7.33E−17 −1.33E−14 −1.60E−14 
γ11 −5.22E−09 −1.17E−08 −6.10E−09 −6.06E−10 −3.51E−09 −3.33E−09 −6.48E−08 −7.33E−11 −1.33E−08 −1.60E−08 
ε11 −4.99E−09 6.69E−09 6.71E−11 3.91E−11 −2.22E−11 1.65E−10 −1.45E−09 −1.04E−11 3.00E−09 3.86E−09 
ε21 2.86E−15 −2.47E−15 −5.85E−15 3.66E−17 9.36E−16 1.94E−15 −1.06E−14 3.34E−17 −2.65E−15 −6.39E−15 
η11 −4.99E−06 6.69E−06 6.71E−08 3.91E−08 −2.22E−08 1.65E−07 −1.45E−06 −1.04E−08 3.00E−06 3.86E−06 
η21 2.86E−12 −2.47E−12 −5.85E−12 3.66E−14 9.36E−13 1.94E−12 −1.06E−11 3.34E−14 −2.65E−12 −6.39E−12 
ρ11 −5.22E−12 −1.17E−11 −6.10E−12 −6.06E−13 −3.51E−12 −3.33E−12 −6.48E−11 −7.33E−14 −1.33E−11 −1.60E−11 
obs 187 351 408 349 283 145 92 311 70 71 
 (6) Scope 1+2 
 (6.1) (6.2) (6.3) (6.4) (6.5) (6.6) (6.7) (6.8) (6.9) (6.10) 
#Industry #10 #15 #20 #25 #30 #35 #40 #45 #50 #55 
Objective value 8.66E+08 7.69E+08 2.56E+08 7.88E+07 1.62E+08 7.82E+07 1.24E+07 1.22E+08 4.60E+07 1.06E+08 
Constant (α) −3.49E+04 −9.96E+04 9.68E+03 5.51E+02 4.89E+03 8.16E+02 2.18E+04 1.53E+04 −1.60E+04 6.58E+05 
α1 7.27E+00 2.00E+02 6.18E−01 8.88E−01 2.03E+00 1.93E+00 6.96E+00 4.87E−01 7.06E+00 −1.83E+00 
α2 1.96E−04 9.13E−05 2.40E−06 4.14E−07 2.58E−06 8.88E−05 −8.92E−06 9.30E−06 1.01E−05 −1.31E−04 
β1 −3.49E−04 −7.31E−04 −1.46E−05 −1.32E−05 −1.93E−05 −4.54E−05 2.16E−06 −1.45E−05 −3.38E−05 −3.04E−04 
γ1 6.51E−01 2.69E−01 9.85E−01 9.87E−01 9.81E−01 9.55E−01 1.00E+00 9.85E−01 9.66E−01 6.96E−01 
α11 6.40E−04 −5.95E−03 −5.30E−06 −1.35E−05 −2.49E−05 −4.99E−04 −2.20E−04 −7.32E−06 −1.24E−03 −4.08E−04 
α12 −4.46E−09 2.74E−10 7.21E−10 1.24E−11 1.81E−10 −1.31E−09 2.23E−10 2.55E−10 1.05E−09 1.09E−08 
α21 −4.46E−09 2.74E−10 7.21E−10 1.24E−11 1.81E−10 −1.31E−09 2.23E−10 2.55E−10 1.05E−09 1.09E−08 
α22 −3.06E−15 −4.77E−16 −2.57E−15 −1.02E−16 −2.61E−15 2.18E−14 1.63E−15 −2.37E−15 9.03E−17 2.10E−15 
β11 −1.20E−14 −9.42E−15 −9.14E−15 −8.26E−16 −4.96E−15 −3.65E−15 −5.89E−14 −6.72E−16 −1.31E−14 −1.72E−14 
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γ11 −1.20E−08 −9.42E−09 −9.14E−09 −8.26E−10 −4.96E−09 −3.65E−09 −5.89E−08 −6.72E−10 −1.31E−08 −1.72E−08 
ε11 2.91E−09 6.13E−09 7.84E−11 5.89E−11 −1.47E−11 2.30E−09 −1.23E−09 −9.53E−11 3.10E−09 −8.05E−10 
ε21 5.72E−15 −5.36E−16 −6.59E−15 1.49E−16 9.80E−16 −9.85E−15 −9.09E−15 6.11E−16 −2.84E−15 −5.76E−15 
η11 2.91E−06 6.13E−06 7.84E−08 5.89E−08 −1.47E−08 2.30E−06 −1.23E−06 −9.53E−08 3.10E−06 −8.05E−07 
η21 5.72E−12 −5.36E−13 −6.59E−12 1.49E−13 9.80E−13 −9.85E−12 −9.09E−12 6.11E−13 −2.84E−12 −5.76E−12 
ρ11 −1.20E−11 −9.42E−12 −9.14E−12 −8.26E−13 −4.96E−12 −3.65E−12 −5.89E−11 −6.72E−13 −1.31E−11 −1.72E−11 
obs 162 333 398 329 277 144 92 309 71 66 
 (7) Scope 1+2+3 
 (7.1) (7.2) (7.3) (7.4) (7.5) (7.6) (7.7) (7.8) (7.9) (7.10) 
#Industry #10 #15 #20 #25 #30 #35 #40 #45 #50 #55 
Objective value 1.78E+08 1.90E+08 1.18E+08 1.65E+08 1.41E+08 5.69E+07 2.16E+06 1.92E+08 2.42E+07 4.01E+07 
Constant (α) 2.28E+05 2.11E+05 5.17E+04 −3.89E+03 −1.12E+04 −6.90E+04 2.87E+04 −8.36E+03 4.98E+02 −3.84E+05 
α1 −7.26E+01 2.05E+02 2.67E−01 1.02E+01 4.61E+00 2.27E+01 2.69E+00 8.66E−01 6.84E+00 4.67E+02 
α2 7.16E−04 1.93E−04 7.19E−06 −1.30E−05 −6.35E−06 −9.56E−05 −4.88E−06 2.28E−04 2.77E−06 4.96E−05 
β1 −1.08E−03 −9.42E−04 −5.27E−05 −2.20E−05 1.70E−06 −6.42E−06 −6.69E−05 7.69E−07 −2.57E−05 −9.22E−04 
γ1 −7.61E−02 5.82E−02 9.47E−01 9.78E−01 1.00E+00 9.94E−01 9.33E−01 1.00E+00 9.74E−01 7.81E−02 
α11 1.04E−02 1.52E−03 −4.17E−06 −1.08E−04 −1.63E−04 −1.10E−03 8.33E−05 −3.55E−05 −1.33E−03 −5.48E−03 
α12 −2.76E−08 −1.13E−08 5.34E−10 −2.87E−10 1.15E−09 1.97E−10 7.13E−09 −9.73E−12 2.18E−09 −6.19E−09 
α21 −2.76E−08 −1.13E−08 5.34E−10 −2.87E−10 1.15E−09 1.97E−10 7.13E−09 −9.73E−12 2.18E−09 −6.19E−09 
α22 −3.36E−15 1.91E−14 −5.71E−15 5.89E−16 −1.14E−14 −1.93E−14 3.02E−15 −5.28E−15 −3.84E−15 −6.15E−15 
β11 −1.32E−15 5.22E−16 −1.03E−14 −2.37E−14 −2.34E−14 −2.02E−14 6.13E−15 −9.84E−15 −1.56E−14 −4.80E−15 
γ11 −1.32E−09 5.22E−10 −1.03E−08 −2.37E−08 −2.34E−08 −2.02E−08 6.13E−09 −9.84E−09 −1.56E−08 −4.80E−09 
ε11 5.48E−09 8.53E−10 1.35E−10 1.17E−09 8.24E−10 2.30E−09 −5.19E−09 −7.92E−12 1.17E−09 8.94E−10 
ε21 3.44E−15 −2.81E−15 −1.83E−15 1.29E−15 −1.17E−15 1.66E−14 −4.74E−14 1.82E−15 1.38E−15 7.54E−15 
η11 5.48E−06 8.53E−07 1.35E−07 1.17E−06 8.24E−07 2.30E−06 −5.19E−06 −7.92E−09 1.17E−06 8.94E−07 
η21 3.44E−12 −2.81E−12 −1.83E−12 1.29E−12 −1.17E−12 1.66E−11 −4.74E−11 1.82E−12 1.38E−12 7.54E−12 
ρ11 −1.32E−12 5.22E−13 −1.03E−11 −2.37E−11 −2.34E−11 −2.02E−11 6.13E−12 −9.84E−12 −1.56E−11 −4.80E−12 
obs 48 104 213 191 118 72 37 173 50 43 
 (8) SOx 
 (8.1) (8.2) (8.3) (8.4) (8.5) (8.6) (8.7) (8.8) (8.9) (8.10) 
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#Industry #10 #15 #20 #25 #30 #35 #40 #45 #50 #55 
Objective value 7.80E+07 4.31E+07 2.67E+07 3.80E+07 6.63E+07 4.00E+07 0.00E+00 3.46E+07  2.30E+06 
Constant (α) 2.11E+04 9.43E+02 −1.50E+02 −6.66E+02 −1.15E+02 −2.12E+03 −3.96E+03 −7.83E+01  3.70E+05 
α1 −1.44E+00 5.01E−02 1.88E−01 −3.46E−02 3.18E−01 5.50E+00 0 6.88E−02  −9.18E+01 
α2 1.89E−06 7.92E−07 1.77E−06 5.21E−06 −1.96E−10 −4.99E−07 0 9.20E−07  −4.33E−05 
β1 −2.64E−06 −3.12E−06 −3.22E−06 −7.31E−07 5.35E−09 −1.16E−05 0 −1.10E−06  −1.37E−04 
γ1 9.97E−01 9.97E−01 9.97E−01 9.99E−01 1.00E+00 9.88E−01 1 9.99E−01  8.63E−01 
α11 −2.93E−04 −3.12E−05 4.76E−06 −9.28E−06 6.36E−07 −4.69E−04 0 −1.29E−06  −1.10E−02 
α12 2.32E−10 2.07E−10 −1.43E−12 7.40E−11 3.39E−11 1.79E−09 0 4.16E−12  9.12E−09 
α21 2.32E−10 2.07E−10 −1.43E−12 7.40E−11 3.39E−11 1.79E−09 0 4.16E−12  9.12E−09 
α22 −6.57E−18 −2.80E−16 −2.85E−17 −4.67E−17 −5.37E−16 −6.78E−15 0 −7.83E−17  −2.18E−15 
β11 −4.06E−15 −5.35E−15 −5.50E−15 −2.51E−15 −5.08E−16 −1.12E−15 0 −1.25E−16  −2.51E−14 
γ11 −4.06E−09 −5.35E−09 −5.50E−09 −2.51E−09 −5.08E−10 −1.12E−09 0 −1.25E−10  −2.51E−08 
ε11 6.83E−10 5.67E−11 1.22E−10 1.04E−10 8.21E−12 5.63E−10 0 9.01E−12  1.72E−08 
ε21 1.34E−17 4.21E−17 1.97E−16 −7.81E−16 1.06E−16 −2.23E−15 0 1.18E−17  −4.94E−15 
η11 6.83E−07 5.67E−08 1.22E−07 1.04E−07 8.21E−09 5.63E−07 0 9.01E−09  1.72E−05 
η21 1.34E−14 4.21E−14 1.97E−13 −7.81E−13 1.06E−13 −2.23E−12 0 1.18E−14  −4.94E−12 
ρ11 −4.06E−12 −5.35E−12 −5.50E−12 −2.51E−12 −5.08E−13 −1.12E−12 0 −1.25E−13  −2.51E−11 
obs 126 541 312 184 184 144 1 189 0 21 
 (9) NOx 
 (9.1) (9.2) (9.3) (9.4) (9.5) (9.6) (9.7) (9.8) (9.9) (9.10) 
#Industry #10 #15 #20 #25 #30 #35 #40 #45 #50 #55 
Objective value 8.76E+07 7.75E+07 3.77E+07 6.60E+07 5.06E+07 4.80E+07 6.40E+05 3.86E+07 0.00E+00 1.66E+07 
Constant (α) 3.34E+03 −2.55E+02 7.12E+02 −2.72E+02 −6.72E+02 2.82E+02 −3.85E+05 −1.70E−01 −3.29E+03 1.27E+04 
α1 9.29E−02 4.00E−02 −2.02E−01 4.38E−01 −6.74E−01 1.33E−01 4.14E+01 3.59E−04 0 −5.75E+00 
α2 1.17E−06 1.71E−06 1.73E−06 −7.01E−07 2.69E−05 1.09E−05 1.20E−03 6.14E−09 0 1.05E−06 
β1 −3.18E−06 7.33E−09 −6.72E−07 −1.30E−06 −7.15E−06 −5.30E−06 −2.15E−03 −7.44E−09 0 −9.29E−06 
γ1 9.97E−01 1.00E+00 9.99E−01 9.99E−01 9.93E−01 9.95E−01 −1.15E+00 1.00E+00 1 9.91E−01 
α11 −1.41E−05 3.17E−06 4.71E−06 −7.18E−06 4.71E−05 −4.11E−05 7.41E−02 −5.91E−09 0 1.50E−03 
α12 5.21E−11 2.30E−12 1.06E−10 3.27E−11 −2.24E−10 −2.82E−11 −1.95E−07 3.84E−14 0 5.75E−10 
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α21 5.21E−11 2.30E−12 1.06E−10 3.27E−11 −2.24E−10 −2.82E−11 −1.95E−07 3.84E−14 0 5.75E−10 
α22 −4.67E−17 −5.03E−17 −4.70E−16 2.82E−17 −2.46E−15 8.00E−16 −1.14E−12 −8.20E−19 0 −3.54E−16 
β11 −7.25E−16 −7.40E−16 −6.01E−15 −8.98E−17 6.07E−16 −8.18E−16 1.07E−12 −8.33E−19 0 −1.11E−14 
γ11 −7.25E−10 −7.40E−10 −6.01E−09 −8.98E−11 6.07E−10 −8.18E−10 1.07E−06 −8.33E−13 0 −1.11E−08 
ε11 2.77E−11 1.20E−11 7.82E−11 2.51E−11 −9.74E−11 2.44E−10 −2.40E−07 4.83E−15 0 −3.03E−09 
ε21 9.45E−17 −1.54E−16 1.55E−16 −3.83E−16 2.75E−16 −6.21E−16 2.02E−12 3.14E−19 0 1.66E−15 
η11 2.77E−08 1.20E−08 7.82E−08 2.51E−08 −9.74E−08 2.44E−07 −2.40E−04 4.83E−12 0 −3.03E−06 
η21 9.45E−14 −1.54E−13 1.55E−13 −3.83E−13 2.75E−13 −6.21E−13 2.02E−09 3.14E−16 0 1.66E−12 
ρ11 −7.25E−13 −7.40E−13 −6.01E−12 −8.98E−14 6.07E−13 −8.18E−13 1.07E−09 −8.33E−16 0 −1.11E−11 
obs 197 747 442 254 248 205 11 254 1 100 
 (10) VOC 
 (10.1) (10.2) (10.3) (10.4) (10.5) (10.6) (10.7) (10.8) (10.9) (10.10) 
#Industry #10 #15 #20 #25 #30 #35 #40 #45 #50 #55 
Objective value 7.53E+07 2.45E+07 3.66E+07 4.01E+07 7.25E+06 6.35E+07 1.21E−08 2.48E+07  −1.28E−09 
Constant (α) 4.00E+04 −5.29E+02 −3.76E+02 −3.02E+03 1.34E+06 5.31E+03 1.38E+06 3.02E+03  3.44E+05 
α1 1.51E+00 1.35E+00 2.74E−01 7.57E−01 3.67E+01 −6.73E−01 0.00E+00 1.36E+00  −9.15E+01 
α2 9.99E−07 1.56E−06 −1.99E−07 1.51E−05 −1.12E−03 6.58E−06 0.00E+00 −5.01E−06  0.00E+00 
β1 −1.02E−05 3.35E−09 −9.96E−08 −4.21E−05 −1.80E−04 −2.74E−06 −3.50E−03 3.06E−07  −3.39E−04 
γ1 9.90E−01 1.00E+00 1.00E+00 9.58E−01 8.20E−01 9.97E−01 −2.50E+00 1.00E+00  6.61E−01 
α11 −9.16E−05 −3.37E−05 −6.03E−06 −1.66E−05 5.96E−03 −5.32E−05 −3.57E−03 −4.12E−07  8.24E−03 
α12 6.00E−11 3.64E−11 6.65E−11 3.66E−11 −4.30E−08 4.27E−10 0.00E+00 −4.03E−11  1.76E−08 
α21 6.00E−11 3.64E−11 6.65E−11 3.66E−11 −4.30E−08 4.27E−10 0.00E+00 −4.03E−11  1.76E−08 
α22 −7.79E−17 −9.55E−17 −3.27E−16 −4.37E−16 7.29E−13 −3.66E−15 −3.44E−14 3.31E−16  −9.82E−15 
β11 −1.47E−15 −3.02E−15 −2.27E−15 −7.36E−16 3.67E−14 −1.14E−15 −2.28E−13 −1.69E−15  2.48E−13 
γ11 −1.47E−09 −3.02E−09 −2.27E−09 −7.36E−10 3.67E−08 −1.14E−09 −2.28E−07 −1.69E−09  2.48E−07 
ε11 1.42E−10 4.10E−11 7.96E−11 2.10E−10 −1.06E−08 6.69E−11 3.32E−08 −1.42E−10  −4.96E−08 
ε21 2.45E−16 −7.87E−17 −1.90E−16 −3.60E−16 2.81E−14 8.36E−16 3.36E−13 4.37E−16  0.00E+00 
η11 1.42E−07 4.10E−08 7.96E−08 2.10E−07 −1.06E−05 6.69E−08 3.32E−05 −1.42E−07  −4.96E−05 
η21 2.45E−13 −7.87E−14 −1.90E−13 −3.60E−13 2.81E−11 8.36E−13 3.36E−10 4.37E−13  0.00E+00 
ρ11 −1.47E−12 −3.02E−12 −2.27E−12 −7.36E−13 3.67E−11 −1.14E−12 −2.28E−10 −1.69E−12  2.48E−10 
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obs 127 248 186 119 21 114 4 65 0 6 
 
 
 
 
 
